

Can Investors Curb Greenwashing?

Fanny Cartellier*, Peter Tankov*, Olivier David Zerbib*

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Abstract

We show how investors with pro-environmental preferences and who penalize revelations of past environmental controversies impact corporate greenwashing practices. Through a dynamic equilibrium model with information asymmetry, we characterize firms' optimal environmental communication, emissions reduction, and greenwashing policies, and we explain the forces driving them. Notably, under a condition that we explicitly characterize, companies greenwash to inflate their environmental score above their fundamental environmental value, with an effort and impact increasing with investors' pro-environmental preferences. However, investment decisions that penalize greenwashing, policies increasing transparency, and environment-related technological innovation contribute to mitigating corporate greenwashing. We provide empirical support for our results.

Keywords: Greenwashing, sustainable finance, asset pricing, ESG investing, impact investing.

JEL codes: G11, G12, G24.

*Fanny Cartellier (Fanny.Cartellier@ensae.fr), Peter Tankov (Peter.Tankov@ensae.fr), and Olivier David Zerbib (Olivier-David.Zerbib@ensae.fr) are at CREST Laboratory, CNRS, Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique, Ecole Polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris. Address: 5, avenue Henry Le Chatelier 91120 Palaiseau, France. For valuable advice, we are grateful to Xavier d'Haultfoeuille, Abraham Lioui, and Zacharias Sautner, Raman Uppal, as well as seminar participants at the Sorbonne Université - Université Paris Cité and the Paris Asset Pricing Breakfast.

1 Introduction

As part of its annual screening of company websites, the European Commission focused on greenwashing practices in 2021. In 42% of cases, the authorities “had reason to believe that the [company’s] claim may be false or deceptive.”¹ This figure suggests that greenwashing, “the practice by which companies claim they are doing more for the environment than they actually are,” is extremely widespread, especially since it can be implemented in a multitude of ways and to varying degrees,² and because it is still largely unregulated.³

Yet, by misinforming stakeholders about the environmental impact of companies, greenwashing creates a major obstacle to the ecological transition. This is a significant concern for investors for two primary reasons: (i) it complicates the evaluation of the environment-related financial risks of their asset allocations, and (ii) it reduces sustainable investors’ positive impact on the environmental practices of companies by making more challenging the evaluation of their environmental footprints. In this paper, we notably show how investors may indirectly incite companies to practice greenwashing, and how they can directly discourage them from doing so.

We build a dynamic equilibrium model with asymmetric information populated by n heterogeneous firms and a representative investor. Each firm has a fundamental environmental value (also referred to as “environmental value”) which it can adjust by investing in green projects (or, equivalently, by “abating” its environmental footprint) at a quadratic cost. However, the investor does not observe the company’s environmental value and relies on the environmental score estimated by a third party such as a rating agency. The company can influence this environmental score directly through environmental communication, which can be positive (e.g., commitment to a net-zero emissions trajectory in 2050 or the launching of green projects; referred to as “green communication”) or negative (e.g., leaving a climate coalition, adjusting emission targets upward; referred to as “brown communication”), but also true or deceptive; the environmental score increases with the company’s positive environmental communication, which also has a quadratic cost. Deceptive communication increases the environmental score without increasing the environmental value, which can give rise to a spread between the two. However, the environmental score reverts back towards the environmental value over time through the action of two forces: (i) continuously, through the analysis of the rating agency, and (ii) discontinuously, through events, to which we also refer as “controversies,” that instantly and publicly reveal a share of the spread between the score and the environmental value.

¹https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_269

²https://futerra-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/The_Greenwash_Guide.pdf

³With the notable exception of the European Union, where a draft European directive aimed at banning “Generic environmental claims and other misleading marketing tricks” is in preparation and could come into force in 2026 if passed by member states: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230918IPR05412/eu-to-ban-greenwashing-and-improve-consumer-information-on-product-durability>.

The occurrence of these events is modeled through a Poisson process. The average revelation rate of the environmental value through these two forces, which we define as the “revelation intensity,” characterizes the degree of information asymmetry affecting the environmental value of each company, with lower revelation intensity corresponding to greater information asymmetry.

The representative investor has two main features: she can have pro-environmental preferences (e.g., Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor, 2021; Zerbib, 2022) and can penalize the spread between a company’s score and its environmental value, which is revealed by controversies. We also refer to this penalty as a “penalty on revealed misrating” or “*misrating* penalty.” This penalization can be interpreted in two ways: either as a readjustment of the environmental score, which the investor considers insufficiently credible, or as an additional penalty linked to poor corporate governance. This penalty echoes other forms of misconduct penalties in related literature (e.g., Egan, Matvos, and Seru, 2022).

The investor allocates her capital among n firms with dynamic mean-variance preferences (e.g., Bouchard, Fukasawa, Herdegen, and Muhle-Karbe, 2018) adjusted to reflect pro-environmental preferences and the penalty associated with revealed score inaccuracies. The firms dynamically choose their (i) emission abatement efforts and (ii) communication efforts to minimize the sum of their cost of capital in equilibrium and their costs of abatement and environmental communication. We show that minimizing the cost of capital in this program is equivalent to maximizing the current market value relative to the future market values. From the optimal communication and abatement efforts, we derive the greenwashing strategy of a company, which we define as positive communication in excess of a contemporaneous abatement effort when the environmental score of the company is already above (or equal to) its environmental value. Therefore, greenwashing is defined as a communication effort that aims at creating or increasing a positive gap between the environmental score and the environmental value.

We document four main results relating to (1) equilibrium expected returns, (2) companies’ optimal environmental communication and abatement strategies, (3) companies’ optimal greenwashing strategy and how investors can curb it, and (4) complementary tools available to policymakers to limit greenwashing and favor abatement. All the results we obtain are closed-form formulas, thereby allowing us to analyze the underlying effects. First, we show that the investor’s penalization of revealed misrating commands a premium on expected returns, which scales with the strength of the penalty. In addition to the green premium documented by Pástor et al. (2021), Pedersen, Fitzgibbons, and Pomorski (2021), and Zerbib (2022), the investor requires higher returns to hold stocks whose environmental score credibility is questionable in light of past controversies. As a result, she underweights these stocks in her asset allocation.

Second, optimal environmental communication and abatement efforts, which are such that their marginal

costs are equal to their marginal benefits, are structured around two forces: (i) an “incentive force,” driven by the investor’s pro-environmental preferences, which pulls both efforts upwards, and (ii) a “corrective force,” associated with the investor’s penalization when a controversy is revealed, which pushes both efforts in opposite directions to reduce the spread between the environmental score and the environmental value. For example, if the company is overrated compared to its fundamental environmental value, the corrective force will play negatively on environmental communication and positively on abatement. Both optimal efforts correspond to the cumulative effect of these two forces. In terms of sensitivity, four points are worth highlighting regarding communication and abatement efforts. (i) An increase in the investor’s pro-environmental preferences leads to a linear increase in both environmental communication and abatement effort. Moreover, an increase in the penalty on revealed misrating leads companies to reduce their environmental communication and increase their abatement when the environmental score overestimates the company’s environmental value. Thus, greater penalization of misrating revealed by controversies increases the investor’s positive impact on companies’ environmental practices. In addition, (ii) the “revelation intensity” of a company’s environmental value, corresponding to the cumulative effort of the rating agencies’ work and the disclosure intensity of controversies, reduces the incentive to communicate and increases the incentive to abate. Indeed, the faster the effect of communication on the score fades, the less this strategy is used by companies. Furthermore, (iii) communication and abatement efforts decrease with their marginal costs per unit of effort (also referred to as “marginal unit cost”). The more expensive it is to abate (communicate), the less the company abates (communicates). Finally, (iv) a subtle interaction effect comes into play: an increase (resp. decrease) in one of the two marginal unit costs (e.g., the marginal unit cost of abatement) leads to a joint downward (resp. upward) move of both efforts (i.e., abatement and communication), because of the investor’s penalty on the spread between a company’s score and its environmental value.

Third, from the optimal environmental communication and emission abatement of a company, we derive its optimal greenwashing strategy. The incentive force, driven by the investor’s pro-environmental preferences, pushes the company to greenwash under an “ON-OFF” condition that guarantees the benefit of adopting such a strategy: the company greenwashes as long as it is sufficiently cheap to engage in environmental communication relative to abatement, the asymmetry of information is sufficiently high, or the company’s rate of time preference is high enough. The condition for the existence of greenwashing does not depend on the penalty imposed by investors when a misrating is revealed by a controversy, but this penalty does impact the degree of greenwashing. Indeed, the company steers its environmental communication relative to its abatement until the difference in the environmental score and the fundamental value reaches a certain threshold, which decreases with the misrating penalty. This penalty is, therefore, a useful tool in the

hands of sustainable investors to counterbalance the indirect incentive they transmit to companies through their pro-environmental preferences. This penalty increases the company’s incentive to abate its emissions, thereby enabling investors to increase the positive impact they have on companies’ environmental practices.

Fourth, we examine two complementary policy instruments for reducing greenwashing: (i) regulations to increase transparency on corporate environmental practices, and (ii) support for environmental technological innovation. Whether through the investigative power of rating agencies or the ability of stakeholders to identify potential controversies, any increase in transparency encourages companies to reduce their greenwashing practices. However, the different vectors of transparency have a heterogeneous impact on companies’ greenwashing strategies. While the impact of the rating agency’s work on reducing greenwashing is strong when investors do not penalize misrating as controversies arise, it becomes more marginal when investors heavily penalize misrating. Conversely, the advent of controversies is complementary to the penalization of misrating by investors: their combined effect is an effective vector for reducing greenwashing. Finally, environmental technological innovation can only reduce greenwashing when it significantly lowers the marginal unit costs of abatement compared with those of communication. Thus, maintaining a sustained and pronounced research and development effort to bring down the marginal costs of new green technologies would, in addition to increasing abatement, simultaneously help curb corporate greenwashing practices.

What if investors adopt an investment strategy by choosing companies relative to the others, either because they practice best-in-class investment strategies or because rating agencies standardize scores? This strategy introduces interaction between companies, which choose their optimal environmental strategies based on those of the others. We formulate an extension to the model, in which the investor normalizes each company’s environmental score by the average environmental score in the investment universe. Through a mean field approximation described in the Internet Appendix, we solve this game and prove that it admits a unique Nash equilibrium. Analytically, we find that the optimal environmental strategy of a representative company follows exactly the same pattern as in the baseline case. Hence, the qualitative conclusions stated above are robust to the introduction of such an interaction between companies. However, we show numerically that this interaction leads to much lower abatement and communication efforts than in the baseline case. Indeed, the incentive for companies to have a high environmental score has softened: the only objective is now to outperform one’s peers. These results suggest that the regular cross-sectional normalization of companies’ environmental scores by rating agencies may have a detrimental impact on the improvement of firms’ environmental performances.

We provide empirical evidence supporting the results of our model. Specifically, because greenwashing practices are unobservable, we focus on global companies’ environmental communication from December

2015 to December 2022, and we document two main results: (i) we show that companies almost structurally engage in *green* (i.e., positive environmental) communication, and (ii) we validate the dynamics of the environmental communication found in our model.

In practice, we propose a two-step empirical method for analyzing companies' environmental communication policies and testing their dynamics in cross-section. To do so, we use monthly data from the data provider Covalence, which constructs an environmental reputation score, an environmental controversy score, and an environmental performance score from published news. The environmental reputation score includes both the environmental communications of companies and the environmental controversies that affect them. Therefore, in the first step, we construct a proxy for the environmental communication score as the orthogonal component of the environmental reputation score to the environmental controversy score, through a Within regression, wherein the environmental controversy score is instrumented by its lagged value to address simultaneity bias. We find that the monthly average flow of environmental communication is positive 98.8% of the time, that is, companies almost structurally engage in green communication (result [i]). In the second step, we provide empirical support for the environmental communication dynamics highlighted by the model (result [ii]). The fundamental environmental value is unknown, but it is legitimate to assume that it is very inert at the monthly frequency. We, therefore, perform a Within regression of the monthly change in environmental communication on the monthly change in environmental score instrumented by the past environmental score, given the simultaneity issue. Through a number of complementary estimations (different sub-samples, different starting dates, and different environmental sub-scores), we find strong evidence that companies steer their environmental communication in a counter-cyclical way according to the evolution of their environmental score.

The almost structurally positive corporate environmental communication, of which the dynamic is supported by the empirical analysis, therefore, suggests that companies may engage in greenwashing, at least part of the time, for three main reasons: the literature not only does not find evidence of companies being structurally underrated by rating agencies but even suggests the presence of an overestimation bias (Manso, 2013); in addition, the marginal unit costs of environmental communication are substantially lower than those of abatement (Bank for International Settlement, 2017); and companies can benefit from information asymmetry about their fundamental environmental values (Barbalau and Zeni, 2023).

Related literature. Our findings extend prior research on greenwashing, asset pricing, and impact investing. First, our paper contributes to the nascent literature on greenwashing. Corporate greenwashing has increased significantly over the past five years (Gourier and Mathurin, 2024) and is particularly prevalent

in cases where companies benefit from information asymmetry (Wu, Zhang, and Xie, 2020). For example, forms of greenwashing have been documented through conflicts of interest between companies and the firms auditing them (Duflo, Greenstone, and Ryan, 2013), as well as, indirectly, when companies sell polluting plants to companies facing weaker environmental pressures without inducing a reduction in overall pollution (Duchin, Gao, and Xu, 2023). However, empirical evidence suggests that investors can contribute to reducing corporate greenwashing: by participating in climate initiatives using the shareholder engagement channel, investors reduce corporate cheap talk on climate issues (Bingler, Kraus, Leippold, and Webersinke, 2023). Yet, asset managers are not exempt from suspicions of greenwashing (Kim and Yoon, 2022), and instances of greenwashing in the news lead to capital outflows from funds marketed as sustainable (Gourier and Mathurin, 2024). These results echo the literature on disclosure, which highlights investors' increased demand for transparency and disclosure (Flammer, 2021; Ilhan, Krueger, Sautner, and Starks, 2023), as well as the literature documenting the divergence between ESG data providers' ratings (Berg, Koelbel, and Rigobon, 2022), and the opacity of data construction (Berg, Fabisik, and Sautner, 2021), emphasizing the complex nature of investment decisions based on ESG criteria. We contribute to this literature by developing, to the best of our knowledge, the first theoretical model linking corporate greenwashing to investor pressure. From an asset pricing perspective, we characterize the mechanisms that induce and reduce corporate greenwashing, and we provide empirical evidence for them.

We also contribute to the asset pricing literature. First, we add to the literature on asset pricing under asymmetric information, which has been built upon two main frameworks: the one wherein investors pay to acquire information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1986; Hughes, 1986) and the one wherein two groups of investors—informed and uninformed investors—coexist (Easley and O'hara, 2004; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia, 2012). We contribute to this field by building an asset pricing model with random revelation times, over which investors have no control, and which allow them to constrain the companies to reduce information asymmetry. This paper is also part of the literature on sustainable asset pricing. Whether for climate (Engle, Giglio, Kelly, Lee, and Stroebel, 2020; Choi, Gao, and Jiang, 2020; Sautner, van Lent, Vilkov, and Zhang, 2023) or biodiversity (Giglio, Kuchler, Stroebel, and Zeng, 2023; Garel, Romec, Sautner, and Wagner, 2023; Coqueret and Giroux, 2023) issues, the pro-environmental preferences of investors (Riedl and Smeets, 2017; Humphrey, Kogan, Sagi, and Starks, 2023) and their expectations of future environmental risks (Krüger, Sautner, and Starks, 2020; Stroebel and Wurgler, 2021; Hambel, Kraft, and van der Ploeg, 2023) command a green premium that increases the cost of capital of the most polluting companies (Pástor et al., 2021; Pedersen et al., 2021; Zerbib, 2022; Bolton and Kacperczyk, 2021; De Angelis, Tankov, and Zerbib, 2023), by an order of magnitude of 1.5% to 2% compared to the

least polluting companies in the US (Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor, 2022; Zerbib, 2022). The effect of the green premium increases with the inelasticity of the demand function of passive sustainable investors (Cheng, Jondeau, Mojon, and Vayanos, 2023), but is attenuated in the presence of uncertainty (De Angelis et al., 2023; Avramov, Cheng, Lioui, and Tarelli, 2022) as well as when green investors also have green consumption preferences (Sauzet and Zerbib, 2022); it can even be almost zero when the investors' demand function is elastic (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2021). In addition, a green premium driven by non-pecuniary motives may alter equilibrium prices in a suboptimal manner from a climate risk perspective (Goldstein, Kopytov, Shen, and Xiang, 2022). It is noteworthy that the rise in the cost of capital of brown companies has been associated in recent years with an increase in the financial performance of the greenest assets due to an unexpected increase in pro-environmental preferences (Pástor et al., 2022; Ardia, Bluteau, Boudt, and Inghelbrecht, 2023), and hence, in the price impact of these flows towards green assets (van der Beck, 2023). We contribute to the sustainable asset pricing literature by showing that investors' penalties for misratings revealed during environmental controversies command a risk premium that increases the cost of capital of the companies whose reputations have been tarnished.

Finally, we contribute to the growing literature on impact investing. Even if the green premium induced by sustainable investment increases the cost of capital of the most polluting companies, the incentive to go green for these companies remains limited (De Angelis et al., 2023), and may even have a counter-productive effect by increasing the environmental footprint of polluting companies, which turn to brown projects that generate short-term cash flows (Hartzmark and Shue, 2023). Yet, Favilukis, Garlappi, and Uppal (2023) show that constrained mandates on green investment can significantly influence the allocation of capital across sectors with a negligible impact on the cost of capital. In any case, a number of papers highlight conditions under which investors can increase their impact on the greening of corporate practices: basing investment decisions on aggregate welfare by internalizing the externalities of all firms in the economy (Green and Roth, 2021; Oehmke and Opp, 2023), funding companies that would not have been funded by regular investors otherwise (Green and Roth, 2021), prioritizing investments where search friction is acute (Landier and Lovo, 2020), and holding a brown stock if it has taken corrective action (Edmans, Levit, and Schneemeier, 2023). Nevertheless, the limits of impact investing are reflected in investors' willingness to pay for impact (Barber, Morse, and Yasuda, 2021), which is limited compared to the willingness to pay to invest in green assets (Bonnenfon, Landier, Sastry, and Thesmar, 2022) and, when it exists, does not scale with the level of impact (Heeb, Kölbl, Paetzold, and Zeisberger, 2023). We contribute to this literature by showing that green investors can have a double impact on corporate practices: indirectly, by encouraging companies to greenwash through their pro-environmental preferences, and directly, by limiting corporate greenwashing

and spurring emission abatement through the penalties they apply when an environmental controversy is revealed.

Outline. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces an economy populated by firms able to greenwash but exposed to the investor penalty. Section 3 describes the equilibrium pricing equations as well as companies’ optimal abatement, communication, and greenwashing strategies. Section 4 presents an extension of the investor’s program with firm interaction and summarizes the main findings in this new setting. Section 5 provides empirical evidence supporting the findings of the model, and Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 An equilibrium model with corporate greenwashing

2.1 Empirical motivation

We motivate our study by documenting the significance and dynamics of corporate environmental communication. To do so, we use data from Covalence, a data provider that constructs an environmental reputation index and an environmental performance score, both between 0 and 100, for companies worldwide at a monthly frequency.⁴ Specifically, based on data from published news, the environmental reputation index reflects companies’ forward-looking environmental communication, which can be positive (e.g., environmental commitments) or negative (e.g., environmental performance below expectations, exit from climate action groups), as well as the occurrence of controversies.

To ensure that we cover a sufficiently reasonable number of companies per month, and given the date of signature of the Paris Agreement, which enshrined the pivotal role of investors in the ecological transition,⁵ we take December 2015 as the starting month for our study. From December 2015 to December 2022, our study covers 3,769 companies.⁶ Between the end of 2015 and the end of 2019, the average environmental reputation index was fairly stable around 80, then rose rapidly between the end of 2019 and the end of

⁴Covalence is a Switzerland-based data provider, founded in 2001, which produces ESG reputation data using media monitoring, artificial intelligence, and human analysis (<https://www.covalence.ch/>). Its services are used by asset managers, asset owners, international organizations and institutions (e.g., the EU, the WWF), and academic institutions. The construction methods of the indices are available in the White Paper available at this URL: https://www.covalence.ch/docs/Covalence_GreenwashingRiskIndicator_WhitePaper.pdf.

⁵Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement calls for “making financial flows compatible with a pathway to low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate-resilient development.”

⁶Until a company’s reputation is monitored, Covalence assigns it a score (supposed to be neutral) of 50. To avoid introducing this bias, we exclude all the rows for which the companies have a reputation index of 50 since the launch of the database by Covalence in 2009 until the moment when their score changes value for the first time. This means that if a company has a reputation score that has been constant at 50 since 2009 and the score rises to 51 before falling back to 50, we do not remove the row where the score falls back to 50.

2022 to reach almost 86. (Figure 1a). Monthly variations in the environmental reputation index reflect companies' environmental communication flows and, when they occur, controversies. Figure 1b shows the average monthly changes in environmental reputation, which we also refer to as environmental reputation flows.⁷ Although they fluctuate substantially, over 96% of these flows are positive, reflecting the intensity and regularity of companies' *positive* environmental communication.

What are the drivers of environmental communication? Without pretending to answer this question at this stage, an analysis of the correlation between monthly variations in environmental reputation and environmental score reveals a surprising dynamic: the proportion of companies showing a negative correlation between variations in their environmental reputation and their previous month's environmental score varies between 63% and 78% over the years (Figure 2). This correlation suggests that companies could use environmental communication as a counter-cyclical instrument to adjust and correct the level of their environmental score. Does this empirical observation shed any light on companies' environmental communication practices? When do companies use environmental communication to greenwash? What role can investors play in influencing greenwashing practices? To answer these questions, we construct a model motivated by these empirical observations.


2.2 The model

Market setting. Our model is inspired by the dynamic asset pricing model of Bouchard et al. (2018), where the volatility matrix of asset prices is exogenous, the expected return vector is determined in equilibrium, and the representative investor maximizes a mean-variance objective. Unlike the above reference, we do not allow for transaction costs, but we introduce additional terms in the investor's objective function to account for non-pecuniary preferences and misrating penalty. On a filtered probability space $(\Omega, \mathbb{F} = (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \geq 0}, \mathbb{P})$ with infinite time horizon, we consider a market with n firms, indexed by $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, issuing stocks at date 0, and a representative investor.⁸ The price process $S \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is assumed to follow the dynamics


$$dS_t = \mu_t dt + \sigma dB_t, \tag{1}$$

⁷It should be noted that the two figures are not completely comparable in the sense that Figure (b), which is the average change in environmental reputation scores, does not strictly represent the first difference of the average environmental reputation score plotted in Figure (a) for the following two reasons. (i) The standard deviation of the reputation scores across companies is very different from (and, precisely, higher than) the standard deviation of the changes in reputation scores across companies. Thus, when a company enters the sample at time t , its reputation score has a greater impact on the average reputation score than the change in its reputation score has on the average change in reputation score of the other companies. (ii) In addition, the last date in the history of each company contains no change in reputation score (because the change in score in t corresponds to the change in score between t and $t + 1$), whereas this date contains a reputation score. This is not a problem, however, as the two graphs are not intended to be compared.

⁸We consider a representative investor to avoid unnecessary model complexity. The main conclusions remain unchanged in a model with several investors with heterogeneous preferences.



(a) Average environmental reputation index



(b) Average monthly changes in environmental reputation index

Figure 1: **Reputation index.** This figure shows the trajectory of the environmental reputation index averaged over all companies and the one-standard-deviation confidence interval (Figure 1a) as well as the average monthly changes of this index (Figure 1b).



Figure 2: **Correlation between changes in environmental reputation and environmental score.** This figure depicts the average correlation between the monthly changes in environmental reputation and the previous month’s environmental score between 2009 and 2022 for all companies in the universe.

where $\mu_t \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is the vector of expected returns of the assets, which is determined in equilibrium, $\sigma \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ is the exogenously specified volatility matrix, which is assumed to be constant and nonsingular, and (B_t) is an n -dimensional Brownian motion. The quantity of stocks of each company is normalized to one. In addition to risky assets, the investor can also invest in a risk-free asset, which is assumed to have a zero rate, without loss of generality. In the remainder of this paper, the i -th component of a vector $h \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is denoted by h^i .

Environmental score. To address the question of greenwashing, we add information asymmetry to this dynamic asset pricing model. The fundamental environmental value of each company i , denoted by V^i , is not observed by the investor. Instead, she observes environmental scores, namely, public ratings provided by a rating agency, which do not perfectly reflect environmental performance due to information asymmetry. The environmental score of company i , E^i , depends on the company’s fundamental environmental value, V^i ,

and its environmental communication effort, c^i , as follows:

$$dE_t^i = \underbrace{a(V_t^i - E_t^i)dt}_{\text{Rating agency effect}} + \underbrace{b(V_t^i - E_t^i)dN_t^i}_{\text{Controversy effect}} + \underbrace{c_t^i dt}_{\text{Communication effect}} + \underbrace{z dW_t^i}_{\text{Measurement error}}, \quad E_0^i = q^i, \quad (2a)$$

$$dV_t^i = \underbrace{r_t^i dt}_{\text{Abatement effect}}, \quad V_0^i = p^i, \quad (2b)$$

where $a, b, z, q^i, p^i \in \mathbb{R}_+$ are constant deterministic parameters, (N_t^i) is a one-dimensional Poisson process of intensity $\lambda^i \in \mathbb{R}_+$, and (W_t^i) a one-dimensional Brownian motion.

The fundamental environmental value of company i , V^i , is determined by its investments in green projects, or in other words, its environmental footprint reduction or “abatement” effort, r^i . However, since the rating agency does not directly observe abatement efforts, the score, E^i , can be influenced by environmental communication, c^i , and measurement noise or error,⁹ zW_t^i . Environmental communication and measurement error can both contribute to creating a discrepancy between the environmental score and fundamental environmental value, but these effects are counterbalanced by two mechanisms revealing the true environmental performance. First, continuous efforts of the rating agency create a force pushing the environmental score towards the fundamental environmental value with speed a . Second, controversies related to the environmental quality of the company arise at random times and contribute to revealing its fundamental environmental value. A controversy at time t reveals a portion $b \leq 1$ of the ongoing *misrating* $|E_t^i - V_t^i|$.¹⁰ Controversies are assumed to arise independently from the measurement error, that is, for each company i , N^i is independent from W^i .

The environmental communication, which has a direct impact on the environmental score, can be used for different purposes.

Definition 1 (Green communication). We refer to *green communication* when a company engages into environmental communication with the aim of raising its environmental score, that is, when $c_t^i > 0$.

Whether truthful or deceptive, green communication refers to positive environmental communication made by a company to convince that its environmental value is higher than its environmental score: it can be a pledge on abatement targets, environmental reporting, or attractive ways to present its environmental policy when answering rating agencies’ questionnaires.

⁹Berg et al. (2022) estimate that measurement differences explain 56% of ESG scores divergence across ESG rating agencies.

¹⁰We refer to controversies as events that reveal a discrepancy between a company’s environmental score and its environmental value. These discrepancies can be positive or negative, in line with the definition of a controversy as “a disagreement or strong debate” (Cambridge Dictionary).

Definition 2 (Brown communication). We refer to *brown communication* when a company engages into environmental communication that has a negative impact on its environmental score, that is, when $c_t^i < 0$.

Brown communication refers to any communication made by a company that adversely affects its public environmental image. The company might opt to backtrack on a previous environmental commitment, announce the abandonment of an emission reduction target, or disclose information regarding its unexpectedly substantial environmental footprint.

Now, we can define the practice of greenwashing, which is a green communication strategy whereby a company oversells its environmental image.

Definition 3 (Greenwashing). Company i is *greenwashing* at time t if (i) it is overrated, that is, $E_t^i \geq V_t^i$, (ii) its environmental communication is positive, $c_t^i > 0$, and (iii) it communicates more than it abates, $c_t^i > r_t^i$. When the company is greenwashing, its *greenwashing effort* is defined as $c_t^i - r_t^i$.

The first two criteria reflect the fact that a company engages in green communication when it is already overrated in terms of its fundamental environmental value. The third criterion allows us to exclude from the scope of greenwashing cases where a company is genuinely communicating about the launch of a new green project ($c_t^i \leq r_t^i$), even though it is already overrated. Greenwashing is, therefore, any communication effort that aims at creating or increasing a positive gap between the environmental score and the fundamental environmental value, when the company is accurately rated or already overrated.

Investor's score for environmental misrating. The investor has a preference for informative environmental scores, as she wishes to allocate her capital to green companies based on accurate information. Therefore, in her asset allocation program, she penalizes companies whose environmental scores have proven inaccurate in the past. The investor builds a score M_t^i for company i at time t , based on the environmental score inaccuracies she has observed through past controversies as follows:

$$dM_t^i = -\rho M_t^i dt + (E_t^i - E_{t-}^i)^2 dN_t^i, \quad M_0^i = u^i, \quad (3)$$

with $\rho, u^i \in \mathbb{R}_+$. At each controversy, that is, when $dN_t^i = 1$, the score M^i jumps upwards, according to the square of the revealed misrating, $|E_t^i - E_{t-}^i|$. This score for misrating is quadratic in the environmental score adjustment because the effect of controversies usually induces dramatic and non-linear repricing (see, for example, the impacts of the 2010 British Petroleum, 2015 Volkswagen, and 2015 ExxonMobil controversies on asset prices). When there is no controversy, the score M^i is continuous and decreases at rate $\rho > 0$, as

the investor gives more importance to recent controversies than older ones. Note that the misrating score, M^i , is positive.

It should be noted that this specification assumes that the investor penalizes all types of inaccuracies, be they positive or negative. In theory, this assumption is justified by the investor's need for transparency on the fundamental environmental value of the company to improve her capital asset allocation. In practice, as we will show below, the companies' scores are pulled upward by the investor's pro-environmental preferences, and controversies generally drive the scores down toward the companies' environmental values.

Program of the investor. The program of the representative investor combines two components: a standard mean-variance portfolio criterion (Bouchard et al., 2018) and a penalty related to non-pecuniary environmental preferences. This penalty is broken down into two parts. As in Pástor et al. (2021) and Zerbib (2022), it includes a preference term for companies with good environmental quality, measured by their public environmental score, E_t . However, the investor is aware of and averse to the low quality of ESG ratings (Berg et al., 2022), which can be biased by environmental communication. Therefore, she also penalizes companies for which past controversies have publicly revealed score inaccuracies using the misrating score, M_t . The investor determines her optimal asset allocation according to the following mean-variance-adjusted program:

$$\sup_{\omega \in \mathbb{A}^\omega} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta^I t} \left\{ \omega'_t dS_t - \frac{\gamma}{2} (\omega' dS)_t + \omega'_t (\beta E_t - \alpha M_t) dt \right\} \right] \quad (4)$$

where $\omega \in \mathbb{A}^\omega$ denotes the vector of quantities invested in each risky asset at time t , \mathbb{A}^ω being the set of admissible strategies for the investor, which we define formally in the proofs, $S_t \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is the asset price vector at time t , and $\gamma \in \mathbb{R}_+^*$ is the risk aversion parameter of the investor. $\beta \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is the investor's preference sensitivity for holding green assets (also referred to as investor's *pro-environmental preferences*), $E_t \in \mathbb{R}^n$ denotes the vector of environmental scores of companies at time t , observed by the investor, $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is the sensitivity parameter to misrating revealed by past environmental controversies, and $M_t \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is the vector of misrating proxies at time t . Finally, $\delta^I \in \mathbb{R}_+^*$ is the investor's rate of time preference. The equilibrium expected returns are determined so that the investor invests optimally and the market clears.

Program of the companies. Company i dynamically determines its optimal abatement effort, r_t^i , and environmental communication effort, c_t^i , by minimizing the sum of its costs of capital, abatement, and

communication, as follows:

$$\inf_{(r^i, c^i) \in \mathbb{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\mu_t^i + \frac{\kappa_r^i}{2} (r_t^i)^2 + \frac{\kappa_c^i}{2} (c_t^i)^2 \right) dt \right], \quad (5)$$

where \mathbb{A} is the set of admissible strategies for the companies, which we define formally in the proofs. The companies face quadratic abatement and communication costs (Battaglini and Harstad, 2016), and κ_r^i and κ_c^i denote the marginal unit costs of abatement and communication, respectively.

We specify the company's program through the minimization of its cost of capital rather than the maximization of its price for four reasons: (i) the cost of capital is a critical financial variable for companies' solvency and profitability, and it is affected by their investments in sustainable projects (e.g., Pástor et al., 2021; Angelis, Tankov, and Zerbib, 2022); (ii) consistent with McConnell and Sandberg (1975) and Nantell and Carlson (1975), the minimization of the cost of capital is a notion almost equivalent to the maximization of the initial price of the company: more precisely, we show that the program with minimization of the cost of capital is equivalent to a program of maximization of the price at the initial time with respect to future prices;¹¹ (iii) the use of a program with maximization of the price in the current framework with information asymmetry would not make it possible to obtain results interpretable in closed-form formulas; (iv) expected returns, which are expressed in monetary terms,¹² are homogeneous to the financial costs of environmental efforts.

It is worth noting that the companies are heterogeneous along several dimensions: their initial characteristics (fundamental environmental value, V_0^i , environmental score, E_0^i , misrating score, M_0^i), the frequency of controversies that impact them (represented by the Poisson process with intensity, λ^i), and the costs of their abatement and communication strategies (κ_r^i and κ_c^i).

3 Optimal greenwashing and investor impact

The program of the investor can be solved explicitly, allowing us to derive expected returns and allocations in equilibrium. For the sake of readability, all proofs are reported in Appendix B.

¹¹The program of company i is equivalent to the following one, written in terms of asset price:

$$\sup_{(r^i, c^i) \in \mathbb{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\delta(S_0^i - S_t^i) - \frac{\kappa_r^i}{2} (r_t^i)^2 - \frac{\kappa_c^i}{2} (c_t^i)^2 \right) dt \right].$$

It is equivalent to maximizing the discounted difference between its current and future asset price, paying quadratic costs for abatement and environmental communication.

¹²As the asset prices follow a normal dynamics (Equation (1)), the expected returns are *price returns* expressed in dollars.

Proposition 3.1. *The optimal asset allocation of the investor is the pointwise solution*

$$\omega_t^* = \frac{1}{\gamma} \Sigma^{-1} (\mu_t + \beta E_t - \alpha M_t),$$

and the equilibrium expected return is

$$\mu_t = \gamma \Sigma \mathbf{1}_n - \beta E_t + \alpha M_t.$$

The investor's optimal allocation breaks down into three parts: the part associated with the standard mean-variance program, $\frac{1}{\gamma} \Sigma^{-1} \mu_t$; the effect of pro-environmental preferences, $\frac{\beta}{\gamma} \Sigma^{-1} E_t$ (Pástor et al., 2021; Zerbib, 2022), which increases (decreases) the allocation in the assets with high (low) environmental scores; the new effect associated with past environmental controversies, which decreases the allocation in the assets of companies that have experienced environmental controversies revealing environmental score inaccuracies, $-\frac{\alpha}{\gamma} \Sigma^{-1} M_t$.

Similarly, expected returns are also composed of the standard mean-variance component, $\gamma \Sigma \mathbf{1}_n$, adjusted for the green premium (Pástor et al., 2021; Zerbib, 2022), $-\beta E_t$, and the premium induced by misrating revealed in the past, αM_t . The greater the inaccuracies in companies' environmental scores revealed by past controversies, the higher the return investors require to hold their assets. The effect of past revealed misrating is scaled by the sensitivity parameter α .

In view of the explicit solution for equilibrium expected returns given in Proposition 3.1, the optimization problem for company i takes the following form:

$$\inf_{(r^i, c^i) \in \mathbb{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\gamma \Sigma \mathbf{1}_n - \beta E_t^i + \alpha M_t^i + \frac{\kappa_r^i}{2} (r_t^i)^2 + \frac{\kappa_c^i}{2} (c_t^i)^2 \right) dt \right].$$

The following proposition provides a solution to this problem, which corresponds to the Stackelberg equilibrium in the game between companies and the investor, wherein the companies, choosing their abatement and communication policies, play the role of the “leader,” and the investor, fixing her portfolio allocation, is the “follower.”

Proposition 3.2 (Optimal strategies). *The optimal environmental communication effort, $c^{i,*}$, and abate-*

ment effort, $r^{i,*}$, of company i are as follows:

$$c_t^{i,*} = \frac{1}{\kappa_c^i} \left(B^i - A^i(E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}) \right), \quad (6a)$$

$$r_t^{i,*} = \frac{1}{\kappa_r^i} \left(\frac{\beta}{\delta} - B^i + A^i(E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}) \right), \quad (6b)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} B^i &= \frac{P^i}{Q^i}, \quad P^i = \beta \left(1 + \frac{A^i}{\delta \kappa_r^i} \right), \quad Q^i = \delta + a + b\lambda^i + \frac{2A^i}{\bar{\kappa}^i}, \quad \bar{\kappa}^i = \frac{2}{\frac{1}{\kappa_r^i} + \frac{1}{\kappa_c^i}}, \\ A^i &= \frac{\bar{\kappa}^i}{4} R^i \left(\sqrt{1 + \frac{16}{\bar{\kappa}^i} \frac{T^i}{(R^i)^2}} - 1 \right), \quad R^i = \delta + 2a + \lambda^i(1 - (1-b)^2), \quad T^i = \frac{\lambda^i b^2 \alpha}{\delta + \rho}, \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

with $E^{i,*}, V^{i,*}$ solutions of (2) when the optimal strategies $c^{i,*}, r^{i,*}$ are employed, $A^i, B^i \geq 0$ and $\frac{\beta}{\delta} - B^i \geq 0$.

Before interpreting in detail the optimal strategies, it is noteworthy that optimal communication and abatement strategies are so that their marginal benefits equal their marginal costs, as detailed in the following proposition. The marginal benefit of communication or abatement is defined as the impact on the integrated discounted cost of capital of increasing one of these strategies over an infinitesimal time interval. This notion is formally defined in Appendix (Definition 6).

Proposition 3.3. *Let two admissible strategies of communication, c^i , and abatement, r^i , and the corresponding environmental score, E^i , and environmental value, V^i , solutions of equation (2) driven by these strategies. The marginal benefit of increasing communication at time t for company i when its environmental strategy is (c^i, r^i) is as follows:*

$$\Pi_t^{c^i, i} = \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda^i} - 2T^i \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-(\delta+a)(s-t)} (1-b)^{N_s^i - N_t^i} (E_s^i - V_s^i) ds \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right].$$

The marginal benefit of increasing abatement at time t for company i when its environmental strategy is (c^i, r^i) is as follows:

$$\Pi_t^{r^i, i} = \frac{\beta}{\delta} - \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda^i} + 2T^i \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-(\delta+a)(s-t)} (1-b)^{N_s^i - N_t^i} (E_s^i - V_s^i) ds \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right].$$

At optimum, communication and abatement strategies, $c^{i,*}$ and $r^{i,*}$, are so that their marginal benefits equal their marginal costs:

$$\Pi_t^{c^{i,*}, i} = \kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*}, \quad \Pi_t^{r^{i,*}, i} = \kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*}.$$

The marginal benefits of increasing communication and abatement at time t can be understood as follows. Both are equal to the sum of (i) a constant component that does not depend on the strategy of the company, $\frac{\beta}{\delta+a+b\lambda^i}$ and $\frac{\beta}{\delta} - \frac{\beta}{\delta+a+b\lambda^i}$, respectively, and which represents the impact of a rise in communication or abatement on the integrated discounted cost of capital through an increase in the environmental score, E^i ; (ii) a stochastic term that depends on the strategy of the company through the discounted integral of its future expected overrating, $(E_s^i - V_s^i)_{s \geq t}$. This second term represents the impact of a rise in communication or abatement on the integrated discounted cost of capital through the channel of the misrating penalty. These quantities will be interpreted in more detail in the rest of this section.

As a result, at the optimum, the marginal cost of the overall environmental effort, $\kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*} + \kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*}$, is equal to the marginal benefit of raising both strategies by the same amount.

Corollary 3.3.1 (Overall environmental effort at optimum). *At the optimum, the environmental strategy $(c^{i,*}, r^{i,*})$ of company i verifies the following equality*

$$\kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*} + \kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*} = \frac{\beta}{\delta}. \quad (8)$$

This optimum equality shows that the marginal benefit of the overall environmental effort of the company, including both abatement and environmental communication, is the expected discounted impact on the cost of capital of increasing the environmental score, E^i : due to the investor's pro-environmental sensitivity β , the discounted integral of the cost of capital decreases by $\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta t} \beta dt = \beta/\delta$. Hence, the investor's penalty on revealed misrating does not influence the overall environmental effort, but only determines the distribution of efforts between abatement and communication.

To facilitate the understanding and interpretation of the optimal strategy, we start by studying two limiting cases: the case wherein the investor has pro-environmental preferences but does not penalize misrating ($\beta > 0, \alpha = 0$), and the one wherein she penalizes misrating but does not have pro-environmental preferences ($\alpha > 0, \beta = 0$).

3.1 Two limiting cases

3.1.1 Pro-environmental preferences, no misrating penalty ($\beta > 0, \alpha = 0$)

In this subsection, we assume that $\beta > 0$ and $\alpha = 0$. In this limiting case, the abatement and environmental communication serve the sole purpose of optimally increasing the company's environmental score, by balancing the benefit of the reduction in cost of capital enabled by these strategies against their respective financial costs. The optimal distribution of spending between these two types of strategies depends on the

degree of asymmetry of information about the fundamental environmental value of the company, which can be characterized by the following notion of “revelation intensity.”

Definition 4 (Revelation intensity). We refer to $a + b\lambda^i$ as the “revelation intensity” of the environmental score.

The revelation intensity combines the effort of the rating agency, which pushes the environmental rating towards the fundamental environmental value with speed a , with the discontinuous effect of controversies, which act as revealing events, where a portion b of misrating is revealed with intensity λ^i . This quantity represents the average speed at which the fundamental environmental value, V^i , translates into the environmental score, E^i (Equation (2a)), which is also the speed at which the influence of misleading green communication vanishes from the environmental score, E^i . Its inverse can be interpreted as the degree of asymmetry of information about the company’s fundamental environmental value: the lower the revelation intensity, the higher the information asymmetry. Therefore, we will also use the notion of “degree of information asymmetry” to refer to the inverse of the revelation intensity.

In the rest of the paper, we assume that $a + b\lambda^i$ is strictly positive, which means that at least a minimum amount of information about the environmental value is revealed, on average, at each point in time and for each company. The revelation intensity is involved in the optimal distribution between the two types of efforts as follows.

Proposition 3.4 (Optimal strategies). *When the investor has pro-environmental preferences only, optimal efforts of abatement and environmental communication are constant, and have the following values:*

$$r_t^{i,*} = \frac{1}{\kappa_r^i} \left(\frac{\beta}{\delta} - \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda^i} \right), \quad c_t^{i,*} = \frac{1}{\kappa_c^i} \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda^i}. \quad (9)$$

In the absence of penalty on misrating, the marginal benefits of communication and abatement represent the benefit of increasing the environmental score through a raise in communication or abatement, respectively. This benefit is constant and positive for both strategies, as it does not depend on the stochastic overrating of the company, $E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}$. The marginal benefits of the two environmental strategies depend directly, and in opposite ways, on the degree of information asymmetry, through the revelation intensity, $a + b\lambda^i$. Indeed, information asymmetry makes environmental communication (abatement) more (less) efficient at raising the environmental score, because, on average, its impact lasts longer (is delayed).

As the following corollary shows, the two greening strategies are perfect substitutes.

Corollary 3.4.1 (Marginal costs ratio). *When the investor only has pro-environmental preferences, the*

optimal strategies of abatement and environmental communication verify the following:

$$\frac{\kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*}}{\kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*}} = \frac{a + b\lambda^i}{\delta}.$$

At the optimum, on each date, the ratio of marginal costs, $(\kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*}) / (\kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*})$, is equal to the ratio of marginal benefits of each strategy, $(a + b\lambda^i) / \delta$, which is the marginal rate of substitution between abatement and environmental communication. As this ratio does not depend on the two strategies, $c_t^{i,*}$ and $r_t^{i,*}$, and is constant, both strategies are perfect substitutes: the company chooses indifferently between one or the other strategy, depending on their relative costs and discounted efficiencies at raising its environmental score.

The optimal greenwashing strategy of company i in this context is given in the following proposition.

Proposition 3.5 (Greenwashing effort). *When condition*

$$\frac{\kappa_r^i}{\kappa_c^i} > \frac{a + b\lambda^i}{\delta} \tag{10}$$

is satisfied, company i engages in positive communication effort $c_t^{i,} > 0$, which is higher than its abatement effort: $c_t^{i,*} > r_t^{i,*}$. Therefore, except when the company is underrated ($E_t^{i,*} < V_t^{i,*}$) due to measurement error, it always greenwashes. Moreover, its greenwashing effort, $c_t^{i,*} - r_t^{i,*}$, is constant and equal to the positive quantity $G_i^\beta > 0$, with $G_i^\beta = \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}^i} \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda^i} - \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r^i}$.*

When condition (10) is not satisfied, company i never greenwashes.

Greenwashing practices of company i depend on the “ON-OFF” condition (10), which compares the ratio of marginal benefits of the two strategies, $(a + b\lambda^i) / \delta$, with their relative marginal unit costs, κ_r^i / κ_c^i : when it is sufficiently cheap to engage in environmental communication relative to abatement, when the asymmetry of information is sufficiently high, or when the company’s rate of time preference is high enough, the company greenwashes. Otherwise, it never engages in greenwashing. When condition (10) is satisfied, the amount of greenwashing effort, G_i^β , is constant, and (i) it increases linearly in the investor’s green sensitivity, β , (ii) increases with the degree of information asymmetry (decreases with the revelation intensity) and the marginal unit cost of abatement κ_r^i , and (iii) decreases with the marginal unit cost of communication κ_c^i .

We are now able to determine the impact of company i ’s greenwashing effort, which we define as follows.

Definition 5 (Greenwashing impact). The impact of greenwashing is the asymptotic value of the expected spread between the environmental score, E^i , and the environmental value, V^i . Formally, it writes as follows:

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[E_t^i - V_t^i].$$

The expectation is taken to average out the measurement error. In addition, we consider the asymptotic value because this expected spread tends very quickly towards a limit value with a simple and informative expression, as illustrated in the next Proposition.

Proposition 3.6 (Greenwashing impact). *When condition (10) is satisfied, the impact of company i 's optimal greenwashing strategy is equal to*

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}] = \frac{1}{a + b\lambda^i} G_i^\beta > 0,$$

where the convergence takes place with an exponential rate.

The impact of company i 's greenwashing is equal to the integral of its greenwashing effort, G_i^β , discounted by the revelation intensity, as $\frac{1}{a+b\lambda^i} G_i^\beta = \int_t^\infty e^{-(a+b\lambda^i)(s-t)} G_i^\beta ds$. Company i 's greenwashing strategy, therefore, induces a positive bias in its environmental score, which becomes, on average, higher than its environmental value. This bias increases linearly in the greenwashing effort, G_i^β , and hence, increases linearly in the investor's green sensitivity, β . It is noteworthy that the greenwashing impact decreases even faster with the revelation intensity than the greenwashing effort due to the combined revelation effect of the rating agency and the controversies over time.

Therefore, when condition (10) is satisfied, a higher marginal unit cost of abatement, degree of information asymmetry, or rate of time preference leads to an increase in greenwashing effort and impact, while abatement decreases. As for the investor's pro-environmental sensitivity, β , its increase leads to an increase in both greenwashing and abatement efforts at the same rate: their ratio remains constant (Propositions 3.4 and 3.5).

3.1.2 Misrating penalty, no pro-environmental preferences ($\alpha > 0, \beta = 0$)

In this subsection, we assume that $\beta = 0$ and $\alpha > 0$. In this limiting case, abatement and environmental communication of company i are solely directed towards increasing the accuracy of its environmental score, that is, to bring it closer to its environmental value.

Proposition 3.7 (Optimal strategies). *When the representative investor does not have pro-environmental preferences ($\beta = 0$), but penalizes misrating ($\alpha > 0$), the optimal abatement and communication efforts are as follows:*

$$r_t^{i,*} = \frac{A^i}{\kappa_r^i} (E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}), \quad c_t^{i,*} = -\frac{A^i}{\kappa_c^i} (E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}), \quad (11)$$

with $A^i > 0$ given in Proposition 3.2. In this context,

- (i) When the company is overrated ($E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*} > 0$), it engages in brown communication ($c_t^{i,*} < 0$) and abates ($r_t^{i,*} > 0$).
- (ii) When the company is underrated ($E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*} < 0$), it engages in green communication ($c_t^{i,*} > 0$) and makes brown investment ($r_t^{i,*} < 0$).

The marginal benefits of abatement and environmental communication, respectively $\frac{A^i}{\kappa_r^i}(E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*})$ and $-\frac{A^i}{\kappa_c^i}(E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*})$, are now stochastic and depend on the company's overrating, $(E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*})$, with the same coefficient but opposite signs. Thus, these strategies work in opposite directions and symmetrically at reducing the discrepancy between the environmental score and the fundamental environmental value of the company. For example, when the environmental score is higher than the environmental value, the company spends on brown communication ($-c_t^{i,*} > 0$) and abatement ($r_t^{i,*} > 0$) until the marginal costs of both of these quantities equal their marginal benefit, $A^i(E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*})$. Therefore, the coefficient A^i drives a “corrective force” and represents the expected marginal discounted penalty on the company's cost of capital when the environmental score is one unit above the environmental value.

The next corollary shows that, in this limiting case also, the two types of strategies are perfect substitutes.

Corollary 3.7.1 (Marginal costs ratio). *When there is the investor penalty only ($\beta = 0$), the optimal strategies of abatement and environmental communication verify the following:*

$$\frac{\kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*}}{\kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*}} = -1.$$

As in the previous limiting case, the marginal rate of substitution between the two strategies, equal to the ratio of their marginal benefits, is constant and now equal to -1 . Indeed, both strategies, while playing in opposite directions, have the same efficiency at increasing the accuracy of the environmental score: environmental communication drives the environmental score in one direction, and abatement drives the company's environmental value in the other, with the same impact on the reduction of the spread between the environmental score and the environmental value. Therefore, their relative use by the company depends only on their relative marginal costs.

The next proposition characterizes the optimal greenwashing policy in this second limiting case.

Proposition 3.8 (Greenwashing). *When the investor does not have pro-environmental preferences ($\beta = 0$), the companies never engage in greenwashing. Therefore, their ratings are, on average, accurate: for every company i , $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}] = 0$, where the convergence takes place with an exponential rate.*

Since the investor does not have pro-environmental preferences, the companies have no benefit in increasing their environmental scores beyond their fundamental environmental values.¹³ In addition, greenwashing would increase their cost of capital due to the threat of the investor’s penalty. Thus, greenwashing is suboptimal in such a case, and companies only practice “virtuous” green communication, that is, green communication with the purpose of pushing their environmental scores closer to their environmental values. As the measurement error in the environmental score is centered, and because there is no greenwashing effort, the expected environmental score quickly converges toward the expected environmental value.

3.2 General case: pro-environmental preferences and misrating penalty

Let us now explain the mechanisms at play in the general case (Proposition 3.2). From now on, we assume that $\beta > 0$ and $\alpha > 0$. In particular, this means that $B^i > 0$ and $A^i > 0$.¹⁴

3.2.1 Optimal communication and abatement

When the representative investor has pro-environmental preferences and penalizes revealed misrating, emissions abatement and environmental communication of company i jointly serve the purpose of increasing its environmental score without decoupling it too much from its fundamental environmental value. Indeed, on the one hand, increasing its environmental score allows the company to benefit from a lower cost of capital due to the investor’s pro-environmental preferences. However, on the other hand, the company strives to keep its environmental score relatively close to its fundamental environmental value to minimize its exposure to the investor penalty.

Specifically, referring to Proposition 3.2, the abatement and communication efforts are driven by two forces: (i) the “incentive force,” $\frac{1}{\kappa_r^i}(\frac{\beta}{\delta} - B^i)$ and $\frac{B^i}{\kappa_c^i}$, for c^i and r^i , respectively, which are positive and increase with the investor’s pro-environmental sensitivity, β , as in the first limiting case, and (ii) the “corrective force,” A^i , which aims at limiting the level of misrating in response to the investor’s penalty on misrating with intensity α , as in the second limiting case. More precisely, both abatement and communication efforts (i) have positive constant parts, $\frac{1}{\kappa_r^i}(\frac{\beta}{\delta} - B^i)$ and $\frac{B^i}{\kappa_c^i}$, respectively, and (ii) depend linearly on overrating, $E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}$, in opposite directions, with coefficient A^i normalized by their marginal unit cost: abatement increases with overrating, and communication decreases with this quantity, which makes them negatively correlated, as in the second limiting case. However, the optimal strategy in the general case is not a simple addition of the strategies described in the two limiting cases. While the misrating adjustment parameter A^i

¹³See Equation (8), wherein the right-hand side is zero.

¹⁴In Equations (7), P^i, T^i are positive when $\beta, \alpha > 0$. Thus, B^i, A^i are positive.

is unchanged, the constant B^i is different from the constant in the first limiting case ($\beta / (\delta + a + b\lambda^i)$): it now takes into account the corrective force through additional terms depending on A^i .

The combination of the investor's pro-environmental preferences and misrating penalty induces a complementarity between the two environmental strategies, as illustrated in Figure 3 and based on the calibration detailed in Appendix C: the average environmental communication now decreases with the marginal unit cost of abatement, whereas in the two limiting cases it increased in this parameter due to the substitutability of the two strategies (Corollaries 3.4.1 and 3.7.1). Indeed, the drop in abatement, due to the increase in the marginal unit cost of abatement, is coupled with a drop in environmental communication, as the company is exposed to a penalty on the difference between its environmental score and its environmental value.




Figure 3: **Average environmental communication and abatement as a function of κ_r^i .** This figure illustrates the asymptote of the expected optimal environmental communication, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[c_t^{i,*}]$, and abatement, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[r_t^{i,*}]$, as a function of the marginal unit cost of abatement, κ_r^i . The calibration is given in Appendix C.

3.2.2 Optimal greenwashing strategy and investor impact

The previous analysis of optimal environmental communication allows us to understand how and when the company practices greenwashing. In this subsection, we characterize the condition under which companies greenwash, the optimal effort of greenwashing, and the impact of greenwashing on the environmental score. This allows us to identify how investors can curb greenwashing.

Proposition 3.9 (Greenwashing effort). *Let us restate condition (10):*

$$\frac{\kappa_r^i}{\kappa_c^i} > \frac{a + b\lambda^i}{\delta}.$$

When this condition is satisfied, company i greenwashes as long as its overrating, $E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}$, is not too high: specifically, it greenwashes if, and only if, $0 \leq E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*} < \frac{1}{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}^i} A^i} G_{max}^i$, where $G_{max}^i = \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}^i} B^i - \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r^i}$. Its greenwashing effort, $c_t^{i,*} - r_t^{i,*}$, is maximal, equal to the positive quantity G_{max}^i , when its score is equal to the fundamental environmental value, $E_t^{i,*} = V_t^{i,*}$, and decreases linearly in the overrating, $E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}$, reaching 0 when the overrating equals $\frac{1}{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}^i} A^i} G_{max}^i$.

When condition (10) is not satisfied, company i never greenwashes.

This proposition can be interpreted in several steps. First, when the representative investor both has pro-environmental preferences and penalizes revealed environmental misrating, company i greenwashes under the same “ON-OFF” condition (10) as when no penalty on misrating is applied (Proposition 3.5). Indeed, the decision to greenwash does not depend on the investor’s penalty, but solely on a condition guaranteeing that it is more beneficial to communicate than abate to raise the environmental score, even when the company is overrated and misrating is penalized. However, the amount of greenwashing effort depends on the investor’s misrating penalty.

The greenwashing effort decreases linearly with the company’s overrating, $E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}$, through the parameter A^i , which represents the “corrective force” due to the penalty. Therefore, the occurrence of an environmental controversy revealing a portion of the company’s overrating triggers both a drop in its environmental score and an increase in its greenwashing effort. This effect echoes the empirical findings of Duchin et al. (2023), providing evidence for greenwashing following an “environmental risk incident.” A related consequence is that company i greenwashes the most when its environmental score correctly reflects the environmental value, that is, when $E_t^{i,*} = V_t^{i,*}$.

Company i no longer greenwashes once the level of overrating, $E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}$, exceeds the greenwashing threshold, $\frac{1}{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}^i} A^i} G_{max}^i$. The greenwashing threshold is equal to the maximal greenwashing effort, G_{max}^i , discounted by the company’s effort to reduce its overrating, $\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}^i} A^i$. When company i ’s overrating is above this threshold, the company allows its overrating to decrease (i) through the action of the rating agency and (ii) by communicating less than abating.

As a result of this greenwashing strategy, the overrating of company i quickly converges, on average, towards a positive quantity that is related to its greenwashing threshold.

Proposition 3.10 (Greenwashing impact). *When condition (10) is satisfied, the impact of company i ’s greenwashing strategy can be measured as:*

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}] = \frac{1}{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}^i} A^i + a + b\lambda^i} G_{max}^i,$$

where the convergence takes place with an exponential rate.

As in the first limiting case, when condition (10) is satisfied, the optimal greenwashing strategy induces a positive bias on the environmental score of company i . Company i 's expected overrating, $\mathbb{E}[E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}]$, converges quickly toward a value that is equal to the greenwashing threshold, $\frac{1}{\frac{2}{\kappa^i} A^i} G_{max}^i$, further discounted by the revelation intensity, $a + b\lambda^i$, over the period, as $\frac{1}{\frac{2}{\kappa^i} A^i + a + b\lambda^i} G_{max}^i = \int_t^\infty e^{-(a+b\lambda^i)(s-t)} e^{-\frac{2}{\kappa^i} A^i (s-t)} G_{max}^i ds$. Therefore, as shown in the proposition below, the investor can have an impact on corporate greenwashing.

Proposition 3.11 (Investor's impact on greenwashing). *When condition (10) is satisfied, the maximal greenwashing effort, G_{max}^i , increases linearly in β and decreases with a convex way in α .*

The effort and impact of greenwashing both increase in the pro-environmental preferences of the investor through G_{max}^i , as these preferences spur companies to display a higher environmental score. However, the investor has the ability to curb greenwashing effort and impact: by increasing her sensitivity to misrating, α , the investor lowers companies' maximal greenwashing efforts, their greenwashing thresholds, and the impact of their greenwashing strategies, which all depend on $(G_{max}^i, 1 \leq i \leq n)$. This translates into a lower average greenwashing effort, as illustrated in Figure 4a.¹⁵

In the proposition below, we show how the misrating penalty also affects the optimal abatement effort of companies.

Proposition 3.12 (Investor's impact on abatement). *The abatement effort that is not driven by the correction of the misrating, $\frac{1}{\kappa^i} \left(\frac{\beta}{\delta} - B^i \right)$, increases linearly in β , and, when condition (10) is satisfied, increases with a concave way in α .*

This proposition highlights the positive impact of investors' penalties for environmental misrating on companies' abatement strategies. In addition to the investor's pro-environmental preferences, which increase abatement efforts, penalizing environmental misrating not only reduces greenwashing but also further increases abatement. In particular, even a small misrating penalty appears to have a significant effect on the abatement effort (Figure 4b). This result adds to the emerging literature on impact investing (Landier and Lovo, 2020; Green and Roth, 2021; Pástor et al., 2022; De Angelis et al., 2023; Oehmke and Opp, 2023) by identifying an effective vector available to investors to encourage companies to mitigate their environmental footprint.

¹⁵As the greenwashing and abatement efforts are linear deterministic functions of the overrating, $E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}$, their expectations also converge at an exponential rate toward their asymptotic values (see Proposition 3.10). This justifies the use of these asymptotic values to analyse average greenwashing and abatement efforts.




Figure 4: **Average greenwashing and abatement as a function of α and β .** This figure displays the asymptotic expected optimal greenwashing ($\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[c_t^* - r_t^*]$; figure a) and abatement ($\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[r_t^*]$; figure b) as a function of the pro-environmental sensitivity, β , and the misrating penalty, α . The calibration is given in Appendix C.

3.3 Complementary tools to curb greenwashing

Our model allows us to identify policy tools that could, as a complement to investor action, contribute to curbing greenwashing, namely (i) increasing transparency and (ii) fostering technological innovation in emission reduction technologies. As it is not possible to carry out an analytical analysis of these tools, their effects are illustrated through numerical sensitivity analyses.

3.3.1 Regulations increasing transparency

In this subsection, we investigate to what extent policies playing on the transparency parameters can be alternative or complementary tools to the penalization of misrating by investors.

When the investor does not penalize the observed misrating, increasing the revelation intensity can strongly deter companies from engaging in greenwashing. Analytically, this effect can be seen in the first limiting case (Proposition 3.4, equation (9)). Figure 5 illustrates the effect of moving each of the transparency parameters (a , b , λ^i) separately on greenwashing efforts and impacts, using the baseline calibration (Appendix C). Increasing the power of the rating agency in recovering the true environmental information through parameter a decreases substantially the greenwashing effort. In addition, increasing any transparency parameter amplifies the mitigation of the greenwashing impact; indeed, a higher revelation intensity does not only deter greenwashing practices, but also makes its effect on the environmental score less durable.

However, when the investor sufficiently penalizes the observed misrating, the action of the rating agency is not an efficient complementary tool: increasing a does not significantly reduce greenwashing efforts and




Figure 5: **Greenwashing effort and impact and transparency parameters when $\alpha = 0$.** This figure displays the maximum greenwashing effort, G_{max}^i , (solid lines), and greenwashing impact, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}]$, (dotted lines), as a function of transparency parameters a, b, λ^i , when the investor's penalty, α , is null. The reference calibration is given in Appendix C.




Figure 6: **Greenwashing effort and impact, penalty α and transparency parameters.** This figure displays the maximum greenwashing effort, G_{max}^i , (first row), and greenwashing impact, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}]$, (second row), as a function of the investor's penalty, α , for different values of transparency parameters a, b, λ^i . The reference calibration is given in Appendix C.

impacts (Figures 6a and 6d). Conversely, the revelation of controversies is a strong complementary tool to the investor penalty of misrating: a minimum level of probability (λ^i) and amplitude (b) of revelation is necessary to channel the effect of the investor penalty; the mitigating effect of the penalty on greenwashing efforts and impacts significantly increases with λ^i and b (Figures 6b, 6c, 6e, 6f). Therefore, increasing the investigating power of stakeholders (hence, contributing to increasing λ^i), or triggering an in-depth re-assessment of the company’s environmental footprint once some overrating is suspected (hence, contributing to increasing b) would complement and increase the impact of investor action by raising the pressure on companies to reduce their greenwashing practices.

3.3.2 Green technological change

Can green technological change help curb greenwashing? Figure 7 suggests that the marginal unit cost of abatement needs to decrease substantially before its impact on greenwashing practices becomes significant. Indeed, companies no longer practice greenwashing when the relative marginal unit cost of abatement versus communication is sufficiently low, that is when the inequality (10) is no longer satisfied (“ON-OFF” greenwashing condition): in the central calibration, when this ratio drops to 5. This result shows that maintaining a sustained and pronounced research and development effort to bring down the marginal costs of new green technologies (Popp, Santen, Fisher-Vanden, and Webster, 2013) would, in addition to increasing abatement (Figure 3), simultaneously help curb corporate greenwashing practices.




Figure 7: **Greenwashing and technological change.** Maximum greenwashing effort, G_{rmax}^i , and impact, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}]$, in function of the ratio of marginal unit costs of abatement and communication κ_r^i/κ_c^i . Consistently with Proposition 3.9, greenwashing is zero when the threshold represented by equation (10) is hit.

4 Introducing interaction between companies

Instead of caring about the absolute environmental value of each company, the investor may prefer to tilt her portfolio, at each time, towards the greenest companies in the investment universe. In this section, we present an extension of the investor’s program presented in Section 2, in which the investor scales the environmental score of each company by the average environmental score of the companies in the investment universe. Through an adjustment of equilibrium expected returns, this change introduces an interaction between the companies’ objectives and generates an n -player game.

The n -player game The investor’s extended program is set as follows:

$$\sup_{\omega \in \tilde{\mathbb{A}}^\omega} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-rt} \left\{ \omega'_t dS_t - \frac{\gamma}{2} \langle \omega' dS \rangle_t + \omega'_t \left(\beta \frac{E_t}{h(\frac{1}{n} \sum_j E_t^j)} - \alpha M_t \right) dt \right\} \right],$$

with h a positive regular function approximating identity on \mathbb{R}_+ . Here, the investor prefers to invest in the “best-in-class” companies, which outperform the others in terms of their environmental scores. This approach is realistic as (i) rating agencies regularly rescale the environmental scores¹⁶ and (ii) ESG investors usually follow a “best-in-class” investment strategy, often at the sector level. Notice that, when h is a constant function equal to one, this program boils down to the one in Section 2.

Similarly to the initial problem, equilibrium expected returns are easily deduced from this new program. They are expressed as follows:¹⁷

$$\mu_t = \gamma \Sigma \mathbf{1}_n - \beta \frac{E_t}{h(\frac{1}{n} \sum_j E_t^j)} + \alpha M_t. \quad (12)$$

Plugging these new equilibrium expected returns in company i ’s program gives the following:

$$\inf_{(r^i, c^i) \in \mathbb{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\gamma \Sigma \mathbf{1}_n - \beta \frac{E_t^i}{h(\frac{1}{n} \sum_j E_t^j)} + \alpha M_t^i + \frac{\kappa_r}{2} (r_t^i)^2 + \frac{\kappa_c}{2} (c_t^i)^2 \right) dt \right].$$

Companies’ programs are now interacting through the average environmental score of companies. Moreover, they are no longer linear quadratic: each company controls both the numerator and the denominator in the

¹⁶For example, MSCI ESG ratings are industry-adjusted according to an industry benchmark, which is revised at least once a year (<https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/34424357/MSCI+ESG+Ratings+Methodology.pdf>). Moreover, Refinitiv LSEG ESG scores are the direct result of a cross-sectional comparison between companies’ raw metrics, which are ranked to calculate percentile scores (https://www.lseg.com/content/dam/data-analytics/en_us/documents/methodology/lseg-esg-scores-methodology.pdf).

¹⁷The main technical results and all the proofs of this section can be found in the Internet Appendix.

term involving its environmental score, $E_t^i/h(\frac{1}{n}\sum_j E_t^j)$. Therefore, to approximate the Nash equilibria of this n -player game with interpretable quantities, we formulate and solve the mean field limit of this game.

To be able to set a mean field game (MFG) that approximates the greenwashing n -player game, we need to make three additional assumptions. (i) Companies are homogeneous: all parameters are the same for each company. (ii) Their environmental scores are driven by idiosyncratic noises: $(W^i, N^i)_i$ are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). (iii) Their stock prices are i.i.d.: the variance-covariance matrix, Σ , is equal to the n -dimensional identity matrix multiplied by a constant, $\sigma^2 \in \mathbb{R}_+^*$. Under these additional assumptions, in the Internet Appendix, we prove that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium at the mean field limit when the problem has a finite horizon.

More specifically, in the Internet Appendix, we exhibit the equilibrium expected returns (12); we demonstrate the convergence of the empirical average to a deterministic continuous and differentiable function under the additional assumptions (i), (ii), and (iii); we define and then demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of the mean field equilibrium (MFE; mean field version of a Nash equilibrium) in the limit Greenwashing mean field game (MFG) with finite horizon; and finally, we define and discuss the notion of “exploitability” to control for the convergence of our algorithm approximating the unique MFE of the Greenwashing MFG.

Results We derive two types of results. First, analytically, we express the optimal strategy of communication and abatement of a generic company as a function of the expectation of its environmental score at the mean field equilibrium. We find that, at the mean field equilibrium, the optimal environmental strategy follows a very similar pattern as in the baseline case (see the Internet Appendix). In particular, optimal efforts follow the structure as in Proposition 3.2 with similar linear coefficients B, A playing the same roles, with the same signs, but being now time-dependent: under the baseline calibration (Appendix C),¹⁸ the normalization of companies’ environmental scores leads to positive abatement, communication, and greenwashing efforts, as in the baseline case without normalization (Figure 8). These results confirm the robustness of our main qualitative conclusions.

Second, however, the numerical analysis shows that all these efforts are lower and lead to a smaller increase in the environmental scores of companies over time than in the baseline case (Figure 9). Indeed, as the investor only values relative scores, companies have less incentive to push their environmental scores as high as possible: the decrease in their cost of capital only stems from a comparison of their environmental score to those of their peers. These results suggest that the cross-sectional normalization of

¹⁸We add to the baseline calibration described in Appendix C the initial value of the environmental score and the environmental value of the company, both set to 50. In addition, to allow comparability with the case without interaction, we modify one parameter in the baseline calibration described in Appendix C: β is changed to 50, so that companies have the same incentive to increase their environmental score at the initial date, whether or not their scores are normalized.

firms' environmental scores by rating agencies has a detrimental effect on the greening efforts of companies.




Figure 8: Average abatement (a), communication (b) and greenwashing (c) efforts with and without interaction (*blue* and *orange* curves respectively).




Figure 9: Average environmental score with and without interaction between the companies.

5 Empirical evidence

In this section, we carry out an empirical analysis of companies' environmental communication flow, c , at a global level to support the results of our model. We focus our empirical study on environmental communication and not on greenwashing directly, as we do not have access to sufficiently robust data on the dynamics of the abatement policies of all the companies studied. We document two main results. First, average environmental communication is positive in almost all the months studied. Second, the empirical dynamics of environmental communication are consistent with those highlighted in the model. We conclude this section by suggesting interpretations regarding corporate greenwashing practices.

5.1 Identification strategy

We develop a two-stage estimation method to analyze the cross-section of companies' environmental communications and provide support for the results of our model.

First step. In the first step, we construct a proxy for the monthly environmental communication flow.

Based on published news, the data provider Covalence constructs a monthly forward-looking environmental reputation score and a monthly environmental controversy score, both between 0 and 100, denoted by Rep_t^i and Con_t^i , respectively, for company $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, available at the end of month $t \in \{1, \dots, T\}$. Consistent with the rise in environmental awareness among investors after the Paris Agreement and the empirical facts documented in Section 2.1, our main analysis covers a scope of 3,769 global companies covered by Covalence at a monthly frequency between December 2015 and December 2022, representing 145,508 firm \times month observations. The description of and statistics on all the variables used in the empirical analysis are available in Appendix D (Table D.9).

Building a proxy for environmental communication involves two challenges. First, as the environmental reputation score is driven by both companies' environmental communication and the controversies that affect them,¹⁹ we construct an environmental communication *score* purged of the effect of environmental controversies, which is defined as the orthogonal component of the environmental reputation score to the environmental controversy score through a Within regression, that is, for company i at the end of month t , $\alpha_1^i + \varepsilon_{1,t}^i$ in Equation (13) below. Second, given the simultaneity of the reputation and controversy scores, we instrument company i 's environmental controversy score at the end of month t by company i 's environmental controversy score at the end of month $t - 1$. More precisely, we estimate the following specification:

$$Rep_t^i = \alpha_1^i + \beta_1 Con_t^{i,*} + \varepsilon_{1,t}^i, \quad (13)$$

where $Con_t^{i,*}$ is the prediction of the following regression:

$$Con_t^i = \alpha_2^i + \beta_2 Con_{t-1}^i + \varepsilon_{2,t}^i. \quad (14)$$

The instrument Con_t^i verifies the relevance condition: the R^2 of the regression of Con_t^i on Con_{t-1}^i is 76.4%, and the correlation between both variables is 81.3%. In addition, the weak exogeneity condition is satisfied, $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, \forall (t', t) \in \{1, \dots, T\}^2, t' \geq t, \mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_{1,t'}^i, Con_t^{i,*}) = 0$, because $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, \forall t \in$

¹⁹See the construction method of the forward-looking reputation indicator on page 4 of the White Paper by Covalence: https://www.covalence.ch/docs/Covalence_GreenwashingRiskIndicator_WhitePaper.pdf

$\{1, \dots, T\}, \forall j \in \{1, \dots, t-1\}, \mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_{1,t}^i \text{Con}_{t-j}^i) = 0$. Indeed, the shocks to environmental reputation scores at the end of month t , $\varepsilon_{1,t}^i$, are uncorrelated with controversies that took place during month $t-j$, with $j \in \{1, \dots, t-1\}$.

The Within estimation under weak exogeneity carries a bias that tends toward zero as the number of periods, T , increases, as shown in the following Lemma. Here, we perform the estimation on a monthly basis and work with $T = 84$ months in the baseline case. In a robustness test, we start the estimation from December 2012, that is, we use $T = 120$ months.

Lemma 5.1. *The bias of the Within estimate under weak exogeneity tends towards zero at a rate faster than or equal to $1/T$.*

Since c_t^i is the flow of firm i 's environmental communication during month t , which can be positive, for example through good environmental news and commitments, or negative, due to poor environmental news, we approximate it as the difference in the environmental communication score between the end of month t and the end of month $t-1$:

$$\hat{c}_t^i \equiv (\hat{\alpha}_1^i + \hat{\varepsilon}_{1,t}^i) - (\hat{\alpha}_1^i + \hat{\varepsilon}_{1,t-1}^i) = \hat{\varepsilon}_{1,t}^i - \hat{\varepsilon}_{1,t-1}^i \quad (15)$$

Second step. In the second step, we provide empirical support for the environmental communication dynamics highlighted by the model, focusing on the time derivative of the equilibrium equation (Equation (6a)).

Indeed, the fundamental environmental values of companies are unknown and probably correlated with companies' environmental scores. However, it is reasonable to assume that these values are highly inert from one month to the next. Thus, we set

$$\frac{1}{\kappa_c} A^i \Delta V_t^i = \eta_1^i + \eta_{2,t}^i, \quad (16)$$

with η_1^i a constant likely to be close to zero and $\eta_{2,t}^i$ an error term, and we focus on the general following specification based on the first differences of the variables:

$$\Delta \hat{c}_t^i = \alpha_3^i + \tau_{3,t} + \beta_3 \Delta E_t^i + \varepsilon_{3,t}^i, \quad (17)$$

where $\Delta \hat{c}_t^i$ is the change in communication flow between month t and month $t+1$, and ΔE_t^i is the change in environmental score between month t (set at the end of month $t-1$) and month $t+1$ (set at the end of month t). To the first difference of the equilibrium equation, we add time fixed effects, $\tau_{3,t}$, to control for unobserved time heterogeneity.

Given the simultaneity between the change in communication flow, $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$, and the change in environmental score, ΔE_t^i , as the communication flow at date $t - 1$ could influence the environmental score at date t , we instrument the change in environmental score with the environmental score available throughout month $t - 1$ and calculated at the end of month $t - 2$, E_{t-2}^i . Therefore, we estimate a Within regression with robust standard errors based on the following specification:

$$\Delta\hat{c}_t^i = \alpha_3^i + \tau_{3,t} + \beta_3\Delta E_t^{i,*} + \varepsilon_{3,t}^i, \quad (18)$$

where $\Delta E_t^{i,*}$ is the prediction of the following regression:

$$\Delta E_t^i = \alpha_4^i + \tau_{4,t} + \beta_4 E_{t-2}^i + \varepsilon_{4,t}^i. \quad (19)$$

So as to draw robust conclusions from the empirical analysis, we carry out the estimations on several samples: the entire universe of companies, as well as the 10%, 20%, ..., 90% of companies with the lowest environmental score within each sector for each month, and the 10%, 20%, ..., 90% of companies with the highest environmental score within each sector for each month. For all these samples, the instrument is relevant and strong (see Tables D.3 and D.4 in Appendix D). In addition, the weak exogeneity condition is satisfied, $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, \forall (t', t) \in \{1, \dots, T\}^2, t' \geq t, \mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_{3,t'}^i \Delta E_t^{i,*}) = 0$, because $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}, \forall t \in \{1, \dots, T\}, \forall j \in \{2, \dots, t - 1\}, \mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_{3,t}^i E_{t-j}^i) = 0$. Indeed, we can reasonably assume that the shocks to the change in communication flow between month t and month $t+1$, $\varepsilon_{3,t}^i$, are uncorrelated with the environmental scores set at the end of month $t - j$, with $j \in \{2, \dots, t - 1\}$. As the estimation is performed at a monthly frequency over 84 months, with a robustness test over 120 months, the bias of the Within estimate under weak exogeneity is likely to be low (Lemma 5.1).

We perform a battery of complementary estimations, including the addition of monthly systematic risk and return controls, $\beta_{t-1}^{CAPM,i}$ and R_{t-1}^i , respectively, estimated at the end of month $t - 1$ and available throughout month t , in Specification (18). More precisely, as a proxy for systematic risk, we use a 12-month rolling CAPM beta, $\beta_t^{CAPM,i} = Var^{-1}(R_t^m)Cov(R_t^i, R_t^m)$, where R^i and R^m denote firm i 's return and the market return, respectively. We also repeat the estimation by starting the analysis period at different dates as well as performing the estimation on several environmental sub-scores.

5.2 Estimations


The regression of the environmental reputation score on the instrumented environmental controversy score (first step, Specification (13)) yields a highly significant $\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.04$ (Table D.2 in Appendix D). This estimation allows us to retrieve the fixed effects, $\hat{\alpha}_1^i$, and the residuals, $\hat{\varepsilon}_{1,t}^i$, the sum of which constitutes a proxy for the environmental communication score.

Although we are not directly interested in the absolute level of the environmental communication score proxy—whose average mean and standard deviation for all companies over the period are 81.2 and 4.9, respectively—it is worthwhile validating the reliability of its average trajectory. To do so, we compare the mean of the environmental communication score proxy with the dynamics of Google searches for the term “net zero,” which is associated with institutional commitments to adopt a strategy aligned with the emissions targets defined by the Paris Agreement. As this term was popularized in 2018 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C (SR15),²⁰ we focus on the Google search dynamics of the term “net zero” from December 2018, in the “Finance” category, on a global scale (Figure 10 [a]). The two trajectories are similar: after a period of stagnation until the end of 2019, they both substantially increased from the end of 2019 to the end of 2021. It coincides with the concomitant introduction of several key environmental regulations worldwide, the dynamics of which are well illustrated in the European Union (EU Green Deal, regulations on binding annual emission reductions, circular economy, sustainable finance, as well as EU biodiversity strategy).²¹ Both trends then slowed down from the beginning of 2022, which coincided with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine when positive environmental communication from companies was a lower priority, especially due to the energy crisis.


The empirical analysis allows us to document two main results. First, computing the proxy for the monthly environmental communication flow, c , shows that 98.8% of the average environmental communication over the period is positive. On average, companies engage almost structurally in *green communication* as defined in the theoretical section (Figure 10 [b]).

²⁰<https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/>

²¹The period from the end of 2019 to the end of 2021 is characterized by the introduction of several fundamental environmental regulations in the European Union: the presentation of the European Green Deal by the European Commission (December 2019) and, within this framework, the presentation of the “farm to fork strategy” (May 2020), aiming to make food systems fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly, declined in an action plan in May 2021, and the EU Chemicals strategy for sustainability published on 14 October 2020. The year 2019 also marks the advent of a Europe-wide EU Strategy for Plastics in the Circular Economy, translated into an action plan in 2020. Moreover, this period corresponds to the start of the application of the EU Regulation on binding annual emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 (Effort Sharing Regulation) adopted in 2018 as part of the Energy Union strategy and the EU’s implementation of the Paris Agreement. The year 2020 also sees the adoption by the European Commission of the new EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 and an associated Action Plan, which is an ambitious plan for protecting nature and reversing the degradation of ecosystems. Finally, this period is shaped by the launch in 2019 and adoption in 2020 and 2021 of a series of legal measures to facilitate sustainable investment (taxonomy, framework, etc.). A detailed review is available at <https://wecoop.eu/regional-knowledge-centre/eu-policies-regulations/>.



(a) Average environmental communication score, $\overline{\hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\varepsilon}_1}$.



(b) Average monthly flow of environmental communication, $\bar{\hat{c}}$.

Figure 10: **Environmental communication.** Figure (a) depicts the average proxy for the environmental communication score, $\hat{\alpha}_1 + \hat{\varepsilon}_1$, (left y-axis) and the score of “net zero” occurrences in Google searches (right y-axis). Figure (b) shows the average monthly flow of environmental communication, \hat{c} .

Second, we find significant empirical evidence supporting the dynamics of environmental communication derived from the theoretical section. We carry out the second-step estimation, whose results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. As expected, $\hat{\beta}_3$ is negative and highly significant for almost all the samples studied. (i) In the entire sample, the beta is -0.119 and the t-stat is -3.6. (ii) In addition, the 10%, 20%, ..., and 90% brownest companies in the universe have a beta ranging from -0.07 to -0.24, with t-statistics below -2.5 for all samples except the top 10% brownest companies, even reaching -4.5 for the 50% brownest companies. (iii) Finally, the 10%, 20%, ..., and 90% greenest companies in the universe have a beta ranging from -0.24 to -0.45 and t-statistics below -3, even reaching -7.7 for the 40% greenest companies. Therefore, the empirical findings suggest that companies, especially the greenest ones, use environmental communication in a counter-cyclical way with respect to the evolution of their environmental score, in line with the results of the model.

The results are robust to the introduction of controls for systematic risks and returns (Table D.5 and D.6, except for the 10% and 20% brownest companies as well as the 10% greenest companies). We carry out other robustness tests by repeating the estimation starting at different dates: December 2012, December 2017, December 2019, and December 2021. The estimate $\hat{\beta}_3$ remains strongly significant (see Tables D.7 showing the example of the 50% brownest and 50% greenest companies of the universe). Finally, we repeat the estimation applied to the three environmental subscores calculated by Covalence, which are related to (i) the environmental impacts of the products sold, (ii) the resources used, and (iii) the emissions, effluents, and waste. For all three subscores, the results are robust (see Table D.8 showing the example of the 50% brownest and 50% greenest companies of the universe).

While the second result supports the counter-cyclical dynamic of the environmental communication highlighted by the model, the first one shows that, at least since December 2015, companies have implemented, on average, a quasi-structural green (i.e., positive environmental) communication policy. There are three possible explanations for this: (i) either companies are structurally underrated by the rating agencies and communicate to raise their environmental score to the level of their fundamental environmental value, (ii) they use green communication to support their continuous abatement effort, or (iii) they are engaging in greenwashing through misleading communication, at least part of the time. Although the scores calculated by rating agencies may be imprecise (Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2011) and the environmental scores tend to diverge between rating agencies (Gibson, Krueger, Riand, and Schmidt, 2020), the academic literature has not documented any structural underestimation of the environmental scores. On the contrary, the rating agencies tend to be biased in favor of borrowers as well as too slow to downgrade following credit quality deterioration (Manso, 2013). In addition, it is reasonable to assume that companies' green communica-

Table 1: **Main estimation (top brownest companies and entire universe).** This Table gives the results of the step-2 estimation, which is a Within panel regression with robust standard errors of the change in the proxy for the environmental communication flow, $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$, on the change in environmental score instrumented by the lagged environmental score, $\Delta E_t^{i,*}$. The estimations are performed for different samples: the top 10%, 20%,..., 90% brownest companies, and the entire universe. The standard deviations are shown in brackets below the estimates.

Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$					
Top brownest companies:					
	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%
$\Delta E_t^{i,*}$	-0.071 (0.051)	-0.164** (0.065)	-0.244*** (0.073)	-0.221*** (0.067)	-0.271*** (0.060)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,760	30,711	44,116	56,785	68,276
R ²	0.005	0.006	0.008	0.010	0.013
Adjusted R ²	-0.061	-0.049	-0.041	-0.035	-0.029
F Statistic	0.985	3.525*	5.460**	3.608*	4.949**
Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$					
Top brownest companies:					
	60%	70%	80%	90%	Whole sample
$\Delta E_t^{i,*}$	-0.237*** (0.053)	-0.176*** (0.049)	-0.188*** (0.046)	-0.158*** (0.040)	-0.119*** (0.033)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	83,309	97,324	110,206	123,864	145,508
R ²	0.015	0.016	0.017	0.017	0.017
Adjusted R ²	-0.023	-0.019	-0.015	-0.012	-0.008
F Statistic	3.476*	1.756	1.875	1.195	0.661

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: **Main estimation (top greenest companies and entire universe)**. This Table gives the results of the step-2 estimation, which is a Within panel regression with robust standard errors of the change in the proxy for the environmental communication flow, $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$, on the change in environmental score instrumented by the lagged environmental score, $\Delta E_t^{i,*}$. The estimations are performed for different samples: the top 10%, 20%,..., 90% greenest companies, and the entire universe. The standard deviations are shown in brackets below the estimates.

Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$					
Top greenest companies:					
	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%
$\Delta E_t^{i,*}$	-0.255*** (0.079)	-0.342*** (0.069)	-0.446*** (0.072)	-0.405*** (0.061)	-0.415*** (0.057)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21,644	35,302	48,184	62,199	77,232
R ²	0.018	0.019	0.021	0.020	0.020
Adjusted R ²	-0.018	-0.013	-0.010	-0.010	-0.009
F Statistic	4.284**	8.542***	14.584***	11.377***	10.606***
Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$					
Top greenest companies:					
	60%	70%	80%	90%	Whole sample
$\Delta E_t^{i,*}$	-0.404*** (0.052)	-0.380*** (0.054)	-0.294*** (0.052)	-0.237*** (0.044)	-0.119*** (0.033)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	88,723	101,392	114,797	126,748	145,508
R ²	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.021	0.017
Adjusted R ²	-0.007	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.008
F Statistic	8.727***	6.709***	3.513*	2.169	0.661

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

tions are more volatile than their abatement policies.²² Therefore, the greenwashing option, at least part of the time, is the most likely, especially as the marginal unit costs of communication are much lower than those of abatement,²³ and because companies can benefit from information asymmetry about their true environmental values (Barbalau and Zeni, 2023).

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we show why and how companies have an incentive to greenwash when investors have pro-environmental preferences. Companies greenwash, provided that the marginal unit cost of environmental communication is sufficiently low compared to the marginal unit cost of abatement, or that information asymmetry is sufficiently high. When these conditions are satisfied, companies greenwash continuously until their environmental score reaches a certain threshold above their fundamental environmental value. This threshold increases with the pro-environmental preferences of the investor, and decreases with the investor's penalty on revealed misrating.

Hence, investors can incentivize companies both to reduce the magnitude of their greenwashing effort and to increase the abatement of their emissions by penalizing misrating revealed by controversies. This penalty, therefore, contributes to reducing the gap between environmental scores and fundamental environmental values. In addition, policymakers have complementary tools at their disposal to curb greenwashing through (i) regulations strengthening transparency on the effective environmental practices of companies, especially the most recent ones, and (ii) pronounced and sustained support for environment-related technological innovation to substantially reduce the marginal costs of abatement.

Several avenues for future research naturally flow from this article. Theoretical work could examine how companies modify their greenwashing policies according to the new incentives they receive when they interact with each other (see De Angelis et al., 2023). It would also be worthwhile to study greenwashing in a general equilibrium model, considering not only investors but also consumers who are affected by greenwashing and respond by boycotting. From an empirical viewpoint, it would be valuable to be able to estimate the effect of greenwashing by approximating the unknown fundamental environmental value of the companies and their abatement policies.

²²To recall, the standard deviation of the proxy for the environmental communication score is 5.3, which can be compared to an average of 56.7.

²³An insightful example is the comparison of the very small certification cost of a green bond compared to the issued amount (Bank for International Settlement, 2017).

Appendix

A Formal definition of the marginal benefit of a strategy

To interpret the shapes of the optimal strategies in the general case and in the two limiting cases, we define the notion of “marginal benefit” of each strategy. A meaningful notion of “marginal benefit” at time t in this continuous time setting can be defined as the impact on the integrated discounted cost of capital of increasing communication or abatement over an infinitesimal time interval. This notion is formally defined below. In this section we fix a given company i and drop the superscript i to save space.

Definition 6 (Marginal benefit of communication and abatement). Let $\epsilon > 0$. For a pair of communication and abatement strategies $c, r \in \mathbb{A}$ and a pair of test functions $\delta c, \delta r \in \mathbb{A}$, let us define the associated pair of modified strategies:

$$c_s^\epsilon := c_s + \epsilon \delta c_s, \quad r_s^\epsilon := r_s + \epsilon \delta r_s.$$

The functional $J(c, r)$ is defined as the expected discounted integral of the cost of capital when the pair of strategies c, r is employed,

$$J(c, r) := \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \{-\gamma \Sigma \mathbf{1}_n + \beta E_t^{c,r} - \alpha M_t^{c,r}\} dt \right],$$

Then, the expected marginal benefits of communication and abatement along directions δc and δr are defined respectively as the directional (Gateaux) derivatives of J in these two directions:

$$\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} (J(c + \epsilon \delta c, r) - J(c, r)), \quad \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} (J(c, r + \epsilon \delta r) - J(c, r)).$$

As we shall see below (see Section B.2), these Gateaux derivatives are linear, and can be expressed through Frechet derivatives D_t^c and D_t^r :

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} (J(c + \epsilon \delta c, r) - J(c, r)) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} D_t^c J(c, r) \delta c_t dt \right], \\ \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} (J(c, r + \epsilon \delta r) - J(c, r)) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} D_t^r J(c, r) \delta r_t dt \right]. \end{aligned}$$

The derivatives $D_t^c J(c, r)$ and $D_t^r J(c, r)$ shall be called marginal benefits of increasing communication or abatement at a given time t , starting from a given pair of strategies (c, r) .

B Proofs

We will use the symbol $\mathbb{H}_k^2(h)$ to denote the set of all \mathbb{F} -progressively measurable \mathbb{R}^k -valued processes $\eta = (\eta_t)_{t \in [0, T]}$ such that $\mathbb{E}[\int_0^\infty e^{-ht} \|\eta_t\|^2 dt] < \infty$ for any parameter $h \in \mathbb{R}_+^*$.

B.1 Equilibrium expected returns and optimal strategy

We restate Proposition 3.1 with its full set of assumptions in Proposition B.1, before proving it.

Proposition B.1. *Let us assume that E, M , solutions of dynamics (2a) and (3), verify $E, M \in \mathbb{H}_N^2(\delta^I)$. Moreover, let us define S as a solution to (1) and the set of admissible strategies \mathbb{A}^ω for the program of the investor (4) as $\mathbb{A}^\omega := \mathbb{H}_N^2(\delta^I)$.*

Then, the optimal portfolio choice of the investor is the pointwise solution

$$\omega_t^* = \frac{1}{\gamma} \Sigma^{-1} (\mu_t + \beta E_t - \alpha M_t),$$

and equilibrium expected returns are

$$\mu_t = \gamma \Sigma \mathbf{1}_n - \beta E_t + \alpha M_t.$$

Proof of Proposition 3.1. Under the assumptions of the proposition, the investor's program can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} & \sup_{\omega \in \mathbb{A}^\omega} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta^I t} \omega_t' \left(\mu_t + \beta E_t - \alpha M_t - \frac{\gamma}{2} \Sigma \omega_t \right) dt \right] \\ &= \sup_{\omega \in \mathbb{A}^\omega} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta^I t} \left\{ -\frac{\gamma}{2} (\omega_t - \omega_t^*)' \Sigma (\omega_t - \omega_t^*) + \frac{\gamma}{2} \omega_t^{*'} \Sigma \omega_t^* \right\} dt \right]. \end{aligned}$$

The optimal portfolio choice of the investor is thus the pointwise solution ω_t^* . In addition, as the quantity of each asset is assumed to be normalised to one in the market, writing $\mathbf{1}_n$ a vector of ones of size n , market clearing condition writes:

$$\forall t, \omega_t^* = \mathbf{1}_n.$$

Equilibrium expected returns are therefore

$$\mu_t = \gamma \Sigma \mathbf{1}_n - \beta E_t + \alpha M_t.$$

□

Proof of Proposition 3.2. As the problem is symmetric for each company and depends solely on its own variables and parameters, we drop the exponent i to lighten notations throughout the proof.

The value function of the company's program is as follows:

$$\hat{v}(q, p, u) = \inf_{(r, c) \in \mathbb{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\gamma(\Sigma \mathbf{1}_n) - \beta E_t^q + \alpha M_t^p + \frac{\kappa_r}{2} (r_t)^2 + \frac{\kappa_c}{2} (c_t)^2 \right) dt \right],$$

with the following constraints. The state variables of the company's program are the tridimensional process (E^q, V^p, M^u) which is the unique strong solution (Protter, 2005, Chapter 5, Theorem 52) to the following SDEs:

$$\begin{cases} dE_t^q = a(V_t^p - E_t^q)dt + b(V_{t-}^p - E_{t-}^q)dN_t + c_t dt + z dW_t, & E_0^q = q, \\ dV_t^p = r_t dt, & V_0^p = p, \\ dM_t^u = -\rho M_t^u dt + b^2(V_{t-}^p - E_{t-}^q)^2 dN_t, & M_0^u = u, \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.1})$$

for $(q, p, u) \in \mathcal{Y}$, $\mathcal{Y} := \mathbb{R}^2 \times \mathbb{R}_+$ and $(c, r) \in \mathbb{A}$. The set of admissible strategies is

$$\mathbb{A} := \{(c, r) \in \mathbb{H}_2^2(\delta^I \wedge \delta)\}.$$

Remark that, as admissible strategies $(c, r) \in \mathbb{A}$ are in $\mathbb{H}_2^2(\delta^I \wedge \delta)$, they are both in $\mathbb{H}_2^2(\delta^I)$ and $\mathbb{H}_2^2(\delta)$.

Equivalence with an auxiliary program First, remark that \hat{v} is equivalent to the following program (which differs only through a constant):

$$\sup_{(r, c) \in \mathbb{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\beta E_t^q - \alpha M_t^u - \frac{\kappa_r}{2} (r_t)^2 - \frac{\kappa_c}{2} (c_t)^2 \right) dt \right]$$

Modulo adding a constant term, and using that $e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E}[V_t^p] \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} 0$ according to Lemma B.2 and B.3 for any admissible control, this can be rewritten as:

$$\sup_{(r, c) \in \mathbb{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\beta(E_t^q - V_t^p) - \alpha M_t^u - \frac{\kappa_r}{2} \left(r_t - \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right)^2 - \frac{\kappa_c}{2} (c_t)^2 \right) dt \right].$$

Then, remark that for all $t \geq 0$,

$$\frac{\kappa_r}{2} \left(r_t - \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right)^2 + \frac{\kappa_c}{2} (c_t)^2 = \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4} \left(c_t - r_t + \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right)^2 + \frac{1}{2(\kappa_r + \kappa_c)} (\kappa_c c_t + \kappa_r r_t - \frac{\beta}{\delta})^2.$$

Let $\xi_t = c_t - r_t$ with $(r, c) \in \mathbb{A}$ and introduce the new state process $X_t = E_t^q - V_t^p$, so that

$$\begin{aligned} dX_t^x &= -aX_t^x dt - bX_{t-}^x dN_t + \xi_t dt + z dW_t, & X_0 &= x = q - p, \\ dM_t^u &= -\rho M_t^u dt + (-bX_{t-}^x)^2 dN_t, & M_0 &= u. \end{aligned}$$

We have $\hat{v}(q, p, u) = \tilde{v}(x, u)$, with

$$\tilde{v}(x, u) = \sup_{\substack{\xi=c-r, \\ (r,c) \in \mathbb{A}}} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\beta X_t^x - \alpha M_t^u - \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4} \left(\xi_t + \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right)^2 - \frac{1}{2(\kappa_r + \kappa_c)} (\kappa_c c_t + \kappa_r r_t - \frac{\beta}{\delta})^2 \right) dt \right].$$

It is then clear that at optimum, the controls satisfy

$$\kappa_c c_t + \kappa_r r_t - \frac{\beta}{\delta} = 0. \quad (\text{B.2})$$

We can then parameterize the two controls with a single process $\xi_t = c_t - r_t$.

This allows us to rewrite the program as a bidimensional problem, i.e. with only two state variables. Consider the auxiliary optimization problem v on $\mathcal{X} := \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R}_+$ as follows:

$$v(x, u) = \sup_{\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} f(X_t^x, M_t^u, \xi_t) dt \right], \quad (\text{B.3})$$

with $f(x, u, \xi) := \beta x - \alpha u - \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4} \left(\xi + \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right)^2$, and the auxiliary bidimensional state variables process (X^x, M^u) as the unique strong solution to the following SDEs (Protter, 2005, Chapter 5, Theorem 52):

$$\begin{cases} dX_s^x = -aX_s^x ds - bX_{s-}^x dN_s + \xi_s ds + z dW_s, & X_0 = x, \\ dM_s^u = -\rho M_s^u ds + (bX_{s-}^x)^2 dN_s, & M_0 = u, \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.4})$$

for $(x, u) \in \mathcal{X}$ and $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$ the set of admissible strategies, verifying

$$\mathbb{A}^\xi := \{ \xi \in \mathbb{H}_1^2(\delta^I \wedge \delta) \}.$$

Note that, by construction, any control (c, r) which verifies equation (B.2) verifies that

$$(c, r) \in \mathbb{A} \iff c - r \in \mathbb{A}^\xi. \quad (\text{B.5})$$

In particular, this is true for optimal controls.

Moreover, note that for any $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$, the bidimensional auxiliary state variable (B.4) admits the following explicit solutions:

$$\begin{cases} X_t^x = \mathcal{E}_t x + \mathcal{E}_t \int_0^t \mathcal{E}_s^{-1} \{ \xi_s ds + z dW_s \} & \text{if } 0 \leq b < 1, \\ X_t^x = \mathbb{1}_{t < \theta_1} \left(x e^{-at} + \int_0^t e^{-a(t-s)} \{ \xi_s ds + z dW_s \} \right) + \mathbb{1}_{t \geq \theta_1} \int_{\theta(t)}^t e^{-a(t-s)} \{ \xi_s ds + z dW_s \} & \text{if } b = 1, \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.6})$$

$$M_t^u = e^{-\rho t} u + \int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} (b X_{s-}^x)^2 dN_s, \quad (\text{B.7})$$

with

$$\mathcal{E}_t = e^{-at} (1-b)^{N_t}, \quad \theta(t) = \sup\{s \leq t : dN_s \neq 0\}, \quad \theta_1 = \inf\{s \geq 0 : dN_s \neq 0\}.$$

Solving the HJB equation of the auxiliary program We first show how the HJB equation satisfied by the value function v of the auxiliary problem may be solved explicitly, and then, in the next paragraph, prove a verification theorem which shows that the explicit solution found in this paragraph indeed coincides with the value function. Consider the following HJB equation.

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\xi \in \mathbb{R}} \left\{ \beta x - \alpha u - \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4} \left(\xi + \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right)^2 \right. \\ \left. - \delta v + \frac{\partial v}{\partial x} (-ax + \xi) - \frac{\partial v}{\partial u} \rho u + \frac{z^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 v}{\partial x^2} + \lambda [v(x(1-b), u + b^2 x^2) - v(x, u)] \right\} = 0, \quad (\text{B.8}) \end{aligned}$$

or in other words, replacing ξ by the optimizing function $\xi^*(x, u) := \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} \frac{\partial v}{\partial x} - \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r}$,

$$\beta x - \alpha u + \frac{1}{\bar{\kappa}} \left(\frac{\partial v}{\partial x} \right)^2 - \delta v - \frac{\partial v}{\partial x} \left(ax + \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right) - \frac{\partial v}{\partial u} \rho u + \frac{z^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 v}{\partial x^2} + \lambda [v(x(1-b), u + b^2 x^2) - v(x, u)] = 0.$$

Let us use the ansatz

$$w(x, u) = \frac{1}{2} A x^2 + B x + C u + w_0.$$

Substituting this function and its derivatives $\frac{\partial w}{\partial x} = Ax + B$, $\frac{\partial w}{\partial u} = C$, $\frac{\partial^2 w}{\partial x^2} = A$ into the HJB equation, we

get:

$$\begin{aligned} & \beta x - \alpha u + \frac{1}{\bar{\kappa}}(Ax + B)^2 - \delta\left(\frac{1}{2}Ax^2 + Bx + Cu + v_0\right) \\ & - (Ax + B)\left(ax + \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}\right) - C\rho u + \frac{z^2}{2}A + \lambda\left[\frac{1}{2}Ax^2((1-b)^2 - 1) - bBx + Cb^2x^2\right] = 0, \end{aligned}$$

and collecting terms with the same powers of u and x , we get that A, B, C are characterized by the following equations:

$$-\alpha - \delta C - \rho C = 0 \tag{B.9}$$

$$\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A^2 - (\lambda(1 - (1-b)^2) + \delta + 2a)A + 2\lambda b^2C = 0 \tag{B.10}$$

$$\left(\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A - \delta - a - \lambda b\right)B + \beta - A\frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} = 0 \tag{B.11}$$

and the candidate optimal control is

$$\hat{\xi}_t = \xi^*(\hat{X}_t^x, \hat{M}_t^u) = \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}\left(A\hat{X}_t^x + B\right) - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}$$

with $(\hat{X}_t^x, \hat{M}_t^u)$ the unique strong solutions of (B.4) when the control $\hat{\xi}$ is employed (Protter, 2005, Chapter 5, Theorem 52). According to equations (B.9) and (B.11), C and B are given as follows:

$$C = -\frac{\alpha}{\rho + \delta}, \quad B = \frac{\beta\left(\frac{A}{\delta\kappa_r} - 1\right)}{\left(\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A - \delta - (a + \lambda b)\right)}.$$

The polynomial of degree 2 in A in equation (B.10) has two roots. One is strictly positive (> 0) (let us call it A^+), and the other one is negative ($A^- \leq 0$) (strictly negative if $\alpha > 0$), as follows:

$$A^- = \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4}\left(\delta + 2a + \lambda(1 - (1-b)^2) - \sqrt{(\delta + 2a + \lambda(1 - (1-b)^2))^2 + 8\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}\lambda b^2\frac{\alpha}{\delta + \rho}}\right), \tag{B.12}$$

$$A^+ = \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4}\left(\delta + 2a + \lambda(1 - (1-b)^2) + \sqrt{(\delta + 2a + \lambda(1 - (1-b)^2))^2 + 8\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}\lambda b^2\frac{\alpha}{\delta + \rho}}\right). \tag{B.13}$$

Lemma B.8 shows that the candidate optimal control associated to A^+ , $\xi_t^+ = \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}(A^+X_t^+ + B) - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}$, with X^+ the strong solution of the first SDE in (B.4) controlled by ξ^+ , is not admissible. Thus, in what follows, we will write $A := -A^-$, and show that the value function of the auxiliary problem is indeed given by the solution of the HJB equation we have just found.

Verification argument for the auxiliary program Let us define on \mathcal{X} the function

$$w(x, u) = -\frac{1}{2}Ax^2 + Bx + Cu + w_0.$$

Let us show that $v = w$.

(i) Let $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$. By Itô's formula applied to $e^{-\delta t}w(X_t^x, M_t^u)$ between 0 and the stopping time τ_n defined below, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} e^{-\delta(t \wedge \tau_n)}w(X_{t \wedge \tau_n}^x, M_{t \wedge \tau_n}^u) &= w(x, u) + \int_0^{t \wedge \tau_n} e^{-\delta s} [-\delta w(X_s^x, M_s^u) + \mathcal{L}^{\xi_s} w(X_s^x, M_s^u)] ds \\ &\quad + \int_0^{t \wedge \tau_n} e^{-\delta s} \frac{\partial w}{\partial x}(X_s^x, M_s^u) z dW_s, \end{aligned}$$

with the stopping time

$$\tau_n := \inf\{t \geq 0 : \int_0^t e^{-\delta s} \left| \frac{\partial w}{\partial x}(X_s^x, M_s^u) \right|^2 ds \geq n\}, \quad \forall n \in \mathbb{N},$$

using the convention that $\inf\{\emptyset\} = \infty$, and the operator $\mathcal{L}^\xi w$ defined as follows:

$$\forall (x, u) \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \mathcal{L}^\xi w(x, u) := \frac{\partial w}{\partial x}(-ax + \xi) - \frac{\partial w}{\partial u} \rho u + \frac{z^2}{2} \frac{\partial^2 w}{\partial x^2} + \lambda [w(x(1-b), u + b^2 x^2) - w(x, u)].$$

The stopped stochastic integral is a martingale, and by taking the expectation we get

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[e^{-\delta(t \wedge \tau_n)}w(X_{t \wedge \tau_n}^x, M_{t \wedge \tau_n}^u)] &= w(x, u) + \mathbb{E}\left[\int_0^{t \wedge \tau_n} e^{-\delta s} \{-\delta w(X_s^x, M_s^u) + \mathcal{L}^{\xi_s} w(X_s^x, M_s^u)\} ds\right] \\ &\leq w(x, u) - \mathbb{E}\left[\int_0^{t \wedge \tau_n} e^{-\delta s} f(X_s^x, M_s^u, \xi_s) ds\right], \end{aligned}$$

from (B.8), as ξ is any admissible control. By Lemmas B.5 and B.6, we may apply the dominated convergence theorem and send n to infinity:

$$\mathbb{E}[e^{-\delta t}w(X_t^x, M_t^u)] \leq w(x, u) - \mathbb{E}\left[\int_0^t e^{-\delta s} f(X_s^x, M_s^u, \xi_s) ds\right]. \quad (\text{B.14})$$

By sending now t to infinity, using again Lemmas B.5 and B.6, we then deduce

$$w(x, u) \geq \mathbb{E}\left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta s} f(X_s^x, M_s^u, \xi_s) ds\right], \quad \forall \xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi,$$

and so $w \geq v$ on \mathcal{X} .

(ii) By repeating the above arguments and observing that the optimal control $\hat{\xi}$ achieves equality in (B.14) by construction, we have

$$\mathbb{E}[e^{-\delta t} w(\hat{X}_t^x, \hat{M}_t^u)] = w(x, u) - \mathbb{E}\left[\int_0^t e^{-\delta s} f(\hat{X}_s^x, \hat{M}_s^u, \hat{\xi}_s) ds\right].$$

From Lemma B.7, $\hat{\xi} \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$, and hence Lemma B.6 can be applied. By sending t to infinity, we then deduce

$$w(x, u) \leq \mathbb{E}\left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |f(\hat{X}_t^x, \hat{M}_t^u, \hat{\xi}_t)| dt\right] \leq v(x, u).$$

Combining with the conclusion to (i), this shows that $w = v$ on \mathcal{X} , and that the process $\{\hat{\xi}_t = \xi^*(\hat{X}_t^x, \hat{M}_t^u), t \geq 0\}$ is an optimal control.

Now, from Lemma B.9, we get that that if ξ^1 and ξ^2 are both optimal controls, then

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\xi_t^1 - \xi_t^2|^2 dt = 0,$$

hence the optimal control is unique, up to t -almost everywhere and almost sure equivalence.

Conclusion for the initial optimization program By (B.2) and (B.5), we can deduce the unique optimal control (c^*, r^*) to the equivalent program \hat{v} from the following system:

$$\begin{cases} \kappa_c c_t^* + \kappa_r r_t^* - \frac{\beta}{\delta} = 0, \\ \xi_t^* = c_t^* - r_t^*. \end{cases}$$

Hence, optimal strategies of the company are as follows:

$$r_t^* = \frac{1}{\kappa_r} \left(A(E_t^* - V_t^*) + \frac{\beta}{\delta} - B \right), \quad c_t^* = \frac{1}{\kappa_c} \left(-A(E_t^* - V_t^*) + B \right),$$

with (E^*, V^*, M^*) solutions of (B.1) controlled by (c^*, r^*) and

$$A = \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4} \left(\delta + 2a + \lambda(1 - (1 - b)^2) \right) \left(\sqrt{1 + 8 \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} \lambda b^2 \frac{\alpha}{\delta + \rho}} - 1 \right), \quad B = \frac{\beta(1 + \frac{A}{\delta \kappa_r})}{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} A + \delta + a + \lambda b}$$

positive coefficients, as all parameters are positive. Moreover,

$$\frac{\beta}{\delta} - B \geq 0 \iff \frac{1}{\delta} > \frac{1 + \frac{A}{\delta\kappa_r}}{\delta + a + \lambda b + \frac{2}{\kappa}A} \iff 1 > \frac{\delta + \frac{A}{\kappa_r}}{\delta + a + \lambda b + \left(\frac{1}{\kappa_r} + \frac{1}{\kappa_c}\right)A},$$

which is always true as all parameters are non negative. \square

Lemma B.2. *If $\eta \in \mathbb{H}_1^2(\delta)$, then $\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\eta_t| dt \right] < \infty$. Hence, in particular, $\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\eta_t| dt < \infty$ a.s..*

Proof. We have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\eta_t| dt \right] &= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\eta_t| \mathbb{1}_{|\eta_t| \geq 1} dt + \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\eta_t| \mathbb{1}_{|\eta_t| < 1} dt \right] \\ &\leq \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\eta_t|^2 dt \right] + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} dt \right] < \infty \end{aligned}$$

as $\eta \in \mathbb{H}_1^2(\delta)$. \square

Lemma B.3. (i) *Let η a progressively measurable process verifying $\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\eta_t| dt < \infty$ a.s. Then,*

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \int_0^t |\eta_s| ds = 0 \text{ a.s..}$$

(ii) *If moreover $\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\eta_t| dt \right] < \infty$, then $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^t |\eta_s| ds \right] = 0$.*

Proof. (i) Assume $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \int_0^t |\eta_s| ds$ does not exist or is not zero for a non null probability. Therefore, there exists a measurable set $N \subset \Omega$, $\mathbb{P}(N) > 0$, so that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \int_0^t |\eta_s| ds$ does not exist or is nonzero for every $\omega \in N$. Let us reason for a fixed $\omega \in N$. Then, there exists $c > 0$ and an increasing sequence $(t_n) \in \mathbb{R}_+^{\mathbb{N}}$ which tends to ∞ so that $e^{-\delta t_n} \int_0^{t_n} |\eta_s| ds > c$ for every n . Take two natural numbers k, l with $k \leq l$. Define $c_1 := e^{-\delta t_k} \int_0^{t_k} |\eta_s| ds$. Then $e^{-\delta t_l} \int_0^{t_k} |\eta_s| ds = c_1 e^{-\delta(t_l - t_k)}$ and hence $e^{-\delta t_l} \int_{t_k}^{t_l} |\eta_s| ds > c - c_1 e^{-\delta(t_l - t_k)}$. When t_l is big enough, there exists $\gamma > 0$ so that $c - c_1 e^{-\delta(t_l - t_k)} > \gamma$. Moreover,

$$e^{-\delta t_l} \int_{t_k}^{t_l} |\eta_s| ds \leq \int_{t_k}^{t_l} e^{-\delta s} |\eta_s| ds.$$

So for t_l big enough, we get $\int_{t_k}^{t_l} e^{-\delta s} |\eta_s| ds \geq \gamma > 0$ with a non-null probability. Now, take t_l, t_k to ∞ . As $\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\eta_t| dt$ converges almost surely, $\int_{t_k}^{t_l} e^{-\delta s} |\eta_s| ds$ tends to zero almost surely. There is a contradiction. Hence, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \int_0^t |\eta_s| ds = 0$ a.s..

(ii) By Fubini, $\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\eta_t| dt \right] < \infty$ implies that $\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E} [|\eta_t|] dt < \infty$. By the same argument as in part (i), $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \int_0^t \mathbb{E} [|\eta_s|] ds = 0$. Applying Fubini again, conclude that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^t |\eta_s| ds \right] = 0$. \square

Lemma B.4. *If $\xi \in \mathbb{H}_1^2(\delta)$, then*

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t |X_s^x|^2 ds \right) dt \right] < \infty.$$

Moreover, $\forall t \geq 0$, $\mathbb{E}[|M_t^u|] < \infty$.

Proof. (i) By integration by parts,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t |X_s^x|^2 ds \right) dt \right] &= \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty |X_t^x|^2 \left(\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta s} ds \right) dt - \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left(\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta s} ds \right) \left(\int_0^t |X_s^x|^2 ds \right) \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{\delta} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |X_t^x|^2 dt - \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t |X_s^x|^2 ds \right) \right] \end{aligned}$$

Now, referring to the explicit expression of X^x in (B.6), we have, for $b < 1$, using Jensen inequality,

$$\begin{aligned} |X_t^x|^2 &\leq 3 \left(\mathcal{E}_t^2 |x|^2 + \int_0^t e^{-a(t-s)} ds \int_0^t e^{-a(t-s)} (1-b)^{2(N_t - N_s)} |\xi_s|^2 ds + z^2 \left(\int_0^t e^{-a(t-s)} (1-b)^{N_t - N_s} dW_s \right)^2 \right) \\ &\leq 3 \left(|x|^2 + \frac{1}{a} \int_0^t |\xi_s|^2 ds + z^2 \left(\int_0^t e^{-a(t-s)} (1-b)^{N_t - N_s} dW_s \right)^2 \right). \end{aligned} \tag{B.15}$$

Noting that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\left(\int_0^t e^{-a(t-s)} (1-b)^{N_t - N_s} dW_s \right)^2 \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^t e^{-2a(t-s)} (1-b)^{2(N_t - N_s)} ds \right] \leq t, \tag{B.16}$$

we get

$$\mathbb{E} [|X_t^x|^2] \leq 3 \left(|x|^2 + \frac{1}{a} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^t |\xi_s|^2 ds \right] + z^2 t \right). \tag{B.17}$$

Hence, applying Fubini,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |X_t^x|^2 dt \right] \leq \tilde{C} \mathbb{E} \left[1 + \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t \xi_s^2 ds \right) dt \right]$$

with a constant $\tilde{C} > 0$. By integration by parts, we have

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t \xi_s^2 ds \right) dt \right] = \frac{1}{\delta} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \xi_t^2 dt - \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t \xi_s^2 ds \right) \right].$$

As $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$, by Lemma B.3, we have $\mathbb{E} \left[\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t \xi_s^2 ds \right) \right] = 0$. Therefore,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t \xi_s^2 ds \right) dt \right] = \frac{1}{\delta} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \xi_t^2 dt \right] < \infty.$$

Hence, we obtain that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |X_t^x|^2 dt \right] < \infty.$$

Using Lemma B.3 again, this implies in particular that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t |X_s^x|^2 ds \right) \right] = 0.$$

As a consequence,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t |X_s^x|^2 ds \right) dt \right] = \frac{1}{\delta} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |X_t^x|^2 dt \right] < \infty$$

The same arguments can be used for $b = 1$. This concludes the first part of the proof.

(ii) Using the explicit expression of M in (B.7), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} [|M_t^u|] &\leq e^{-\rho t} u + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} (bX_s^x)^2 dN_s \right] \\ &\leq u + \lambda b^2 \int_0^t \mathbb{E} [(X_s^x)^2] ds. \end{aligned}$$

Now, by Fubini, $\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t \mathbb{E} [(X_s^x)^2] ds \right) dt = \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t X_s^2 ds \right) dt \right]$, which is finite for $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$ according to (i). Thus, $\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t \mathbb{E} [(X_s^x)^2] ds \right) dt$ is finite. By the property of the Lebesgue integral, it implies that $\int_0^t \mathbb{E} [(X_s^x)^2] ds$ is finite for t almost everywhere. Since $t \mapsto \int_0^t \mathbb{E} [(X_s^x)^2] ds$ is increasing, $\int_0^t \mathbb{E} [(X_s^x)^2] ds$ is actually finite for all $t \geq 0$, otherwise a contradiction can be easily exhibited. Hence, for all $t \geq 0$, $\mathbb{E} [|M_t^u|] < \infty$. This concludes the proof. □

Lemma B.5. *For any admissible control $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$, for all $(x, u) \in \mathcal{X}$, we have*

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |f(X_t^x, M_t^u, \xi_t)| dt \right] < \infty.$$

Proof.

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |f(X_t^x, M_t^u, \xi_t)| dt \right] \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\beta |X_t^x| + \alpha M_t^u + \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4} \left(\xi_t + \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right)^2 \right) dt \right]$$

We have, for $b < 1$,

$$\begin{aligned} |X_t^x| &\leq \mathcal{E}_t |x| + \mathcal{E}_t \left| \int_0^t \mathcal{E}_s^{-1} \{ \xi_s ds + z dW_s \} \right| \\ &\leq |x| + \int_0^t |\xi_s| ds + z \left(1 + \left(\int_0^t e^{-a(t-s)} (1-b)^{N_t - N_s} dW_s \right)^2 \right). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.18})$$

By (B.16), we deduce

$$\mathbb{E} [|X_t^x|] \leq \mathbb{E} \left[|x| + \int_0^t |\xi_s| ds + z(1+t) \right] \quad (\text{B.19})$$

Moreover we have, by integration by parts:

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t |\xi_s| ds \right) dt \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{\delta} \left(\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\xi_t| dt + \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \int_0^t |\xi_s| ds \right) \right].$$

As $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$, the expectation of the left term of the sum is finite by Lemma B.2. Moreover, by Lemma B.3, the expectation of the “lim” term is null. Applying Fubini, we finally get that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \beta |X_t^x| dt \right] < \infty.$$

The method with $b = 1$ follows the same argument.

As for $\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |M_t^u| dt \right]$,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |M_t^u| dt \right] &\leq \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(e^{-\rho t} u + \int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} (bX_s^x)^2 dN_s \right) dt \right] \\ &\leq \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(e^{-\rho t} u + \lambda \int_0^t \mathbb{E} [(bX_s^x)^2] ds \right) dt, \end{aligned}$$

which is finite for $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$ according to Lemma B.4.

Finally, $\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4} \left(\xi_t + \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right)^2 dt \right] \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{2} \left(\xi_t^2 + \left(\frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right)^2 \right) dt \right]$ which is finite as $\xi \in \mathbb{H}_1^2(\delta)$. \square

Lemma B.6. For every $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$ and every $t > 0$,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} |w(X_s^x, M_s^u)| \right] < \infty.$$

Moreover,

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E} [w(X_t^x, M_t^u)] = 0.$$

Proof. (i) Let us show that $\mathbb{E}[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} |w(X_s^x, M_s^u)|] < \infty$. We have

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} |w(X_s^x, M_s^u)| \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} A \mathbb{E} \left[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} (X_s^x)^2 \right] + B \mathbb{E} \left[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} |X_s^x| \right] + |C| \left(u + \mathbb{E} \left[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} \int_0^s e^{-\rho(s-y)} (bX_y^x)^2 dN_y \right] \right).$$

If $b < 1$, referring to (B.15) and using Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, there exists a positive constant \tilde{C} so that for every $t \geq 0$,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} |X_s^x|^2 \right] \leq \tilde{C} \mathbb{E} \left[|x|^2 + \int_0^t |\xi_u|^2 du + z^2 t \right].$$

This upper boundary is finite as $\mathbb{E}[\int_0^t |\xi_u|^2 du] \leq \mathbb{E}[e^{\delta t} \int_0^t e^{-\delta u} |\xi_u|^2 du]$, which is finite as $\xi \in \mathbb{H}_1^2(\delta)$. Thus, $\mathbb{E}[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} |X_s^x|^2]$ is finite.

Moreover, recalling (B.18), and applying again Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, we similarly get that $\mathbb{E}[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} |X_s^x|] < \infty$ for $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$, using this time Lemma B.2 to say that $\mathbb{E}[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta u} |\xi_u| du] < \infty$.

Finally, as $s \mapsto \int_0^s e^{\rho y} (bX_y^x)^2 dN_y$ is increasing for each trajectory, we have

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} \int_0^s e^{-\rho(s-y)} (bX_y^x)^2 dN_y \right] \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} \int_0^s e^{\rho y} (bX_y^x)^2 dN_y \right] \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^t e^{\rho y} (bX_y^x)^2 dy \right],$$

which is finite since M is integrable for admissible strategies by Lemma B.4.

The same reasoning can be applied when $b = 1$. Therefore, we can conclude by a finite sum of finite terms that, for $0 \leq b \leq 1$,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sup_{0 \leq s \leq t} |w(X_s^x, M_s^u)| \right] < \infty.$$

(ii) Now, let us show that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E}[w(X_t^x, M_t^u)] = 0$. We have

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} |e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E}[w(X_t^x, M_t^u)]| &\leq \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{2} A(X_t^x)^2 + B|X_t^x| + |C| \int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} (bX_s^x)^2 dN_s \right] \\ &= \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{2} A(X_t^x)^2 + B|X_t^x| + |C|b^2 \lambda \int_0^t (X_s^x)^2 ds \right] \end{aligned}$$

using the explicit expression of M^u in (B.7), and as M^u is integrable for admissible strategies by Lemma B.4. Again, assume $b < 1$. Since, by (B.17),

$$e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E}[|X_t^x|^2] \leq 3e^{-\delta t} \left(|x|^2 + \frac{1}{a} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^t |\xi_s|^2 ds \right] + z^2 t \right),$$

and by Lemma B.3, $e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^t |\xi_s|^2 ds \right] \rightarrow 0$, (as $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$), we conclude that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{2} A(X_t^x)^2 \right] = 0$.

Now, let us deal with $e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E}[|X_t^x|]$. Similarly, by (B.19),

$$e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E}[|X_t^x|] \leq e^{-\delta t} \left(|x| + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^t |\xi_s| ds \right] + z(1+t) \right).$$

Moreover, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^t |\xi_s| ds \right] = 0$ by applying successively Lemma B.2 and B.3, as $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$. Therefore, $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E}[B|X_t^x|] = 0$.

Finally, as $\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t (X_s^x)^2 ds \right) dt \right] < \infty$ for admissible strategies (belonging to \mathbb{A}^ξ) according to Lemma B.4, it implies in particular, applying Fubini and due to the property of an infinite integral with positive integrand,

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\int_0^t (X_s^x)^2 ds \right) \right] = 0.$$

The method is the same for $b = 1$. This concludes the proof. □

Lemma B.7. *The optimal control is admissible, i.e. $\hat{\xi} \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$.*

Proof. As $\hat{\xi}_t = \frac{2}{\kappa} \left(-A\hat{X}_t^x + B \right) - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}$, \hat{X}^x, \hat{M}^u are solutions to the following SDEs:

$$\begin{cases} dX_s = (-\zeta X_s + \nu) ds - bX_{s-} dN_s + z dW_s, & X_0 = x, \\ dM_s = -\rho M_s ds + (bX_{s-})^2 dN_s, & M_0 = u, \end{cases}$$

with $\zeta := a + \frac{2}{\kappa} A$, $\nu := \frac{2}{\kappa} B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}$.

The explicit solutions for \hat{X}^x, \hat{M}^u are therefore as follows:

$$\begin{cases} \hat{X}_t^x = \hat{\mathcal{E}}_t x + \hat{\mathcal{E}}_t \int_0^t \hat{\mathcal{E}}_s^{-1} \{\nu ds + z dW_s\} & \text{if } 0 \leq b < 1, \\ \hat{X}_t^x = \mathbb{1}_{t < \theta_1} \left(e^{-\zeta t} x + \int_0^t e^{-\zeta(t-s)} \{\nu ds + z dW_s\} \right) + \mathbb{1}_{t \geq \theta_1} \int_{\theta(t)}^t e^{-\zeta(t-s)} \{\nu ds + z dW_s\} & \text{if } b = 1, \end{cases} \quad (\text{B.20})$$

$$\hat{M}_t^u = e^{-\rho t} u + \int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} (b \hat{X}_{s-}^x)^2 dN_s, \quad (\text{B.21})$$

with $\theta(t), \theta_1$ defined in (B.6) and

$$\hat{\mathcal{E}}_t = e^{-\zeta t} (1-b)^{N_t}.$$

Let us show that $\hat{\xi} \in \mathbb{H}_1^2(\delta^I \wedge \delta)$. We show it for $b < 1$. The method is the same for $b = 1$. For $b < 1$, using the explicit expression of \hat{X}^x in (B.20), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-(\delta^I \wedge \delta)t} |\hat{\xi}_t|^2 dt \right] &\leq \tilde{C} \left(1 + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-(\delta^I \wedge \delta)t} |\hat{X}_t^x|^2 dt \right] \right) \\ &\leq \tilde{C} \left(1 + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-(\delta^I \wedge \delta)t} \left(|x|^2 + \int_0^t \nu^2 ds + z^2 \left(\int_0^t e^{-\zeta(t-s)} (1-b)^{N_t - N_s} dW_s \right)^2 \right) dt \right] \right) \\ &\leq \tilde{C} \left(1 + \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-(\delta^I \wedge \delta)t} (|x|^2 + t\nu^2 + z^2 t) dt \right] \right) < \infty, \end{aligned}$$

with a positive constant \tilde{C} , and using (B.15) and (B.16) along with Fubini. This concludes the proof. \square

Lemma B.8. *Let ξ^+ be the strategy defined by $\xi^+ := \frac{2}{\kappa} (A^+ X_t^+ + B) - \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r}$, with A^+ given in (B.13) and X^+ the strong solution of the first SDE in (B.4) controlled by ξ^+ . ξ^+ is not an admissible strategy, i.e. $\xi^+ \notin \mathbb{A}^\xi$.*

Proof. In part (ii) of the proof of Lemma B.6, we show that, if $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$, then $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E}[B|X_t^x] = 0$, for any $x \in \mathbb{R}$. As $|\mathbb{E}[X_t^x]| \leq \mathbb{E}[|X_t^x|]$, this implies that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E}[X_t^x] = 0$, for any $x \in \mathbb{R}$.

Let us show that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E}[X_t^+] = 0$ is not true for every initial condition $x \in \mathbb{R}$ (we do not write explicitly the dependence of X^+ on its initial condition in its exponent to lighten notations). X^+ is solution to the following SDE:

$$dX_s^+ = \left(\left(\frac{2}{\kappa} A^+ - a \right) X_s^+ + \nu \right) ds - b X_{s-}^+ dN_s + z dW_s, \quad X_0^+ = x,$$

with $\nu = \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}$. Hence, its expectation verifies the following ODE:

$$d\mathbb{E}[X_t^+] = \left(\left(\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A^+ - a - b\lambda \right) \mathbb{E}[X_t^+] + \nu \right) dt.$$

This ODE has a unique solution which is, writing $\zeta^+ := \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A^+ - a - b\lambda$,

$$\mathbb{E}[X_t^+] = e^{\zeta^+ t} \left(x + \frac{\nu}{\zeta^+} \right) - \frac{\nu}{\zeta^+}.$$

Now, remark that

$$\begin{aligned} \zeta^+ - \delta &= \frac{1}{2} \left(\sqrt{(\delta + 2a + \lambda(1 - (1 - b)^2))^2 + 8\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}\lambda b^2 \frac{\alpha}{\delta + \rho}} - \delta - \lambda b^2 \right) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} (\delta + 2a + \lambda(1 - (1 - b)^2) - \delta - \lambda b^2) = a + \lambda(b - b^2) > 0, \end{aligned}$$

as $a + b\lambda > 0$ and $0 \leq b \leq 1$. Hence,

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{-\delta t} \mathbb{E}[X_t^+] = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{(\zeta^+ - \delta)t} \left(x + \frac{\nu}{\zeta^+} \right) - e^{-\delta t} \frac{\nu}{\zeta^+} = \pm\infty \quad \text{if } x \neq -\frac{\nu}{\zeta^+}.$$

Therefore, ξ^+ can not be an admissible strategy. □

Lemma B.9. *For every $\xi \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$, $\forall (x, u) \in \mathcal{X}$, the functional*

$$\mathcal{J} : (x, u, \xi) \mapsto \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} (-f(X_t^x, M_t^u, \xi_t)) dt \right]$$

is strictly convex in ξ and for $\theta \in [0, 1]$, and for $\xi^1, \xi^2 \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$,

$$\theta \mathcal{J}(x, u, \xi_1) + (1 - \theta) \mathcal{J}(x, u, \xi_2) - \mathcal{J}(x, u, \theta \xi_1 + (1 - \theta) \xi_2) \geq \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4} \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\xi_t^1 - \xi_t^2|^2 dt.$$

Proof. Let us show that $\forall t \geq 0$, $\mathbb{E}[-f(X_t^x, M_t^u, \xi_t)]$ is convex in ξ . By linearity of integrals and applying Fubini thanks to Lemma B.5, it will be so for \mathcal{J} . We first deal with the case $b < 1$. We have

$$\mathbb{E}[-f(X_t^x, M_t^u, \xi_t)] = -\beta \mathbb{E}[X_t^x] + \alpha \mathbb{E}[M_t^u] + \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4} \left(\xi_t + \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} \right)^2 \right].$$

X_t^x is linear in ξ according to its explicit expression (B.6). The last term is obviously strictly convex in ξ_t .

As for M_t^u , using its explicit expression (B.7) and the properties of admissible strategies ($\in \mathbb{A}^\xi$),

$$\mathbb{E}[M_t^u] = e^{-\rho t} u + \lambda b^2 \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} (X_s^x)^2 ds \right].$$

Now, $(X_s^x)^2$ is strictly convex in ξ by Jensen inequality. Therefore, by addition of linear and strictly convex terms in ξ , $\mathbb{E}[-f(X_t^x, M_t^u, \xi_t)]$ is strictly convex in ξ , and so is \mathcal{J} . More precisely, by focusing only on the third part, it is easy to show that for $\theta \in [0, 1]$, and for $\xi^1, \xi^2 \in \mathbb{A}^\xi$,

$$\theta \mathcal{J}(x, u, \xi_1) + (1 - \theta) \mathcal{J}(x, u, \xi_2) - \mathcal{J}(x, u, \theta \xi_1 + (1 - \theta) \xi_2) \geq \frac{\bar{\kappa}}{4} \int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} |\xi_t^1 - \xi_t^2|^2 dt.$$

□

B.2 Marginal benefit of a strategy

Proof of Proposition 3.3. (i) Let us start with the marginal benefit of communication

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} (J(c + \epsilon \delta c, r) - J(c, r)) &= \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left\{ \beta \frac{1}{\epsilon} (E_t^{c+\epsilon \delta c, r} - E_t^{c, r}) - \alpha \frac{1}{\epsilon} (M_t^{c+\epsilon \delta c, r} - M_t^{c, r}) \right\} dt \right] \\ &= \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left\{ \beta \frac{1}{\epsilon} (X_t^{c+\epsilon \delta c, r} - X_t^{c, r}) - \alpha \frac{1}{\epsilon} (M_t^{c+\epsilon \delta c, r} - M_t^{c, r}) \right\} dt \right], \end{aligned}$$

as $V_t^{c+\epsilon \delta c, r} - V_t^{c, r} = 0$.

Using the explicit expression of X (B.6), as $\xi = c - r$, we have, when $b < 1$, and for any $\epsilon > 0$,

$$\frac{1}{\epsilon} (X_t^{c+\epsilon \delta c, r} - X_t^{c, r}) = \mathcal{E}_t \int_0^t \mathcal{E}_s^{-1} \delta c_s ds.$$

Therefore, by integration by parts,

$$\begin{aligned} &\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \beta \frac{1}{\epsilon} (X_t^{c+\epsilon \delta c, r} - X_t^{c, r}) dt \right] \\ &= \beta \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \mathcal{E}_t \int_0^t \mathcal{E}_s^{-1} \delta c_s ds dt \right] \\ &= \beta \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} \delta c_t \int_t^\infty e^{-\delta s} \mathcal{E}_s ds dt - \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left(\int_0^t \mathcal{E}_s^{-1} \delta c_s ds \right) \left(\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta s} \mathcal{E}_s ds \right) \right] \end{aligned}$$

Now, using first that \mathcal{E}_s is decreasing, and then Lemma B.3 which can be applied as δc is a test function

(assumed to be admissible),

$$\begin{aligned}
\left| \left(\int_0^t \mathcal{E}_s^{-1} \delta c_s ds \right) \left(\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta s} \mathcal{E}_s ds \right) \right| &\leq \left(\int_0^t \mathcal{E}_s^{-1} |\delta c_s| ds \right) \left(\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta s} \mathcal{E}_s ds \right) \\
&\leq \mathcal{E}_t \left(\int_0^t |\delta c_s| ds \right) \left(\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta s} ds \right) \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} \\
&= \frac{1}{\delta} e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t |\delta c_s| ds \right) \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} 0 \text{ a.s.}
\end{aligned}$$

and therefore

$$\left| \mathbb{E} \left[\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left(\int_0^t \mathcal{E}_s^{-1} \delta c_s ds \right) \left(\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta s} \mathcal{E}_s ds \right) \right] \right| \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{\delta} e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t |\delta c_s| ds \right) \right],$$

which equals 0 by Lemma B.3, as δc is a test function (assumed to be admissible). Hence,

$$\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \beta \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(X_t^{c+\epsilon \delta c, r} - X_t^{c, r} \right) dt \right] = \beta \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \delta c_t \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(s-t)} \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} \mathcal{E}_s ds \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right] dt \right].$$

As a consequence, the part of the Frechet derivative that is due to the X term is given by

$$\beta \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(s-t)} \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} \mathcal{E}_s ds \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right] = \frac{\beta}{a + \delta + b\lambda}.$$

Similar computations can be made when $b = 1$, leading to the same result.

As for the terms in M , using its explicit expression (B.7), we get, using the fact that δc is admissible,

$$\begin{aligned}
\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(M_t^{c+\epsilon \delta c, r} - M_t^{c, r} \right) &= \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} \int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} b^2 \left\{ (X_{s-}^{c+\epsilon \delta c, r})^2 - (X_{s-}^{c, r})^2 \right\} dN_s \\
&= 2b^2 \int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} X_{s-}^{c, r} \mathcal{E}_{s-} \left(\int_0^s \mathcal{E}_y^{-1} \delta c_y dy \right) dN_s
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, by integration by parts, using that $\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} M_t ds \right] < \infty$ for admissible strategies as proved in

Lemma B.5,

$$\begin{aligned}
\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \alpha \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(M_t^{c+\epsilon\delta c, r} - M_t^{c, r} \right) dt \right] &= 2b^2\alpha \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} X_{s-}^{c, r} \mathcal{E}_{s-} \left(\int_0^s \mathcal{E}_y^{-1} \delta c_y dy \right) dN_s \right) dt \right] \\
&= 2 \frac{b^2\alpha}{\delta + \rho} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta s} X_{s-}^{c, r} \mathcal{E}_{s-} \left(\int_0^s \mathcal{E}_y^{-1} \delta c_y dy \right) dN_s \right] \\
&= 2 \frac{b^2\alpha\lambda}{\delta + \rho} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta s} X_s^{c, r} \mathcal{E}_s \left(\int_0^s \mathcal{E}_y^{-1} \delta c_y dy \right) ds \right] \\
&= 2 \frac{b^2\alpha\lambda}{\delta + \rho} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \delta c_t \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(s-t)} X_s^{c, r} \mathcal{E}_s \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} ds \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right] dt \right].
\end{aligned}$$

Indeed, in a similar fashion as for the X term, it can be shown that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left(\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta s} ds \right) \left(\int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} X_{s-}^{c, r} \mathcal{E}_{s-} \left(\int_0^s \mathcal{E}_y^{-1} \delta c_y dy \right) dN_s \right) \right] = 0.$$

Hence, the part of the Frechet derivative that is due to the M term is given by

$$-\frac{2b^2\alpha\lambda}{\delta + \rho} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(s-t)} X_s^{c, r} \mathcal{E}_s \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} ds \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right]$$

Joining together the X term and the M term, we finally obtain:

$$D_t^c J(c, r) = \frac{\beta}{a + \delta + b\lambda} - \frac{2b^2\alpha\lambda}{\delta + \rho} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(s-t)} X_s^{c, r} \mathcal{E}_s \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} ds \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right].$$

(ii) As for D_t^r ,

$$\begin{aligned}
&\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} (J(c, r + \epsilon\delta r) - J(c, r)) \\
&= \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left\{ \beta \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(E_t^{c, r+\epsilon\delta r} - E_t^{c, r} \right) - \alpha \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(M_t^{c, r+\epsilon\delta r} - M_t^{c, r} \right) \right\} dt \right] \\
&= \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left\{ \beta \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(X_t^{c, r+\epsilon\delta r} - X_t^{c, r} \right) + \beta \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(V_t^{c, r+\epsilon\delta r} - V_t^{c, r} \right) - \alpha \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(M_t^{c, r+\epsilon\delta r} - M_t^{c, r} \right) \right\} dt \right],
\end{aligned}$$

Using the explicit expression of X (B.6), as $\xi = c - r$, we have, when $b < 1$, and for any $\epsilon > 0$

$$\frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(X_t^{c, r+\epsilon\delta r} - X_t^{c, r} \right) = -\mathcal{E}_t \int_0^t \mathcal{E}_s^{-1} \delta r_s ds.$$

Similarly to the Gateaux derivative of c , the part of the Frechet derivative that is due to the X term is given

by

$$-\beta \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(s-t)} \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} \mathcal{E}_s ds \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right] = -\frac{\beta}{a + \delta + b\lambda}$$

The term in V is immediate, using the explicit expression of V , $V_t = p + \int_0^t r_s ds$:

$$\frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(V_t^{c, r + \epsilon \delta r} - V_t^{c, r} \right) = \int_0^t \delta r_s ds.$$

Therefore, by integration by parts, similarly to the treatment of the X term in (i),

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \beta \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(V_t^{c, r + \epsilon \delta r} - V_t^{c, r} \right) dt \right] &= \beta \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \left(\int_0^t \delta r_s ds \right) dt \right] \\ &= \frac{\beta}{\delta} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\delta t} \delta r_t dt \right], \end{aligned}$$

so that the part of the Frechet derivative that is due to the V term is given by $\frac{\beta}{\delta}$.

Finally, using the explicit expression of M in (B.7), we get, using the admissibility of δr ,

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} \left(M_t^{c + \epsilon \delta c, r} - M_t^{c, r} \right) &= \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \frac{1}{\epsilon} \int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} b^2 \left\{ (X_{s-}^{c + \epsilon \delta c, r})^2 - (X_{s-}^{c, r})^2 \right\} dN_s \\ &= -2b^2 \int_0^t e^{-\rho(t-s)} X_{s-}^{c, r} \mathcal{E}_{s-} \left(\int_0^s \mathcal{E}_y^{-1} \delta c_y dy \right) dN_s. \end{aligned}$$

By computations similar to the case of δc , the part of the Frechet derivative that is due to the M term is given by

$$2 \frac{b^2 \alpha \lambda}{\delta + \rho} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(s-t)} X_s^{c, r} \mathcal{E}_s \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} ds \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right]$$

Joining together the X term, the V term and the M term, we finally obtain:

$$D_t^r J(c, r) = \frac{\beta}{\delta} - \frac{\beta}{a + \delta + b\lambda} + \frac{2b^2 \alpha \lambda}{\delta + \rho} \mathbb{E} \left[\int_t^\infty e^{-\delta(s-t)} X_s^{c, r} \mathcal{E}_s \mathcal{E}_t^{-1} ds \middle| \mathcal{F}_t \right].$$

(iii) In view of the form of the company's optimization functional (5), the optimal communication and abatement strategies c^* and r^* equalize marginal benefits and marginal costs:

$$D_t^c J(c^*, r^*) = \kappa_c c_t^*, \quad D_t^r J(c^*, r^*) = \kappa_r r_t^*.$$

□

B.3 Interpretation of the optimal strategy

Proof of Corollary 3.3.1. From (6),

$$\kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*} = B^i - A^i(E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}), \quad \kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*} = \frac{\beta}{\delta} - B^i + A^i(E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}).$$

Hence, $\kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*} + \kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*} = \frac{\beta}{\delta}$. □

Proof of Proposition 3.4. Referring to Proposition 3.2 describing optimal controls in the general case, notice that $A^i = 0$ when $\alpha = 0$, and hence $B^i = \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda^i}$. Therefore, optimal controls are given by (9). □

Proof of Corollary 3.4.1. From (9), we get that

$$\kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*} = \frac{\beta}{\delta} - \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda^i}, \quad \kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*} = \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda^i}.$$

Hence,

$$\frac{\kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*}}{\kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*}} = \frac{\delta + a + b\lambda^i}{\delta} - 1 = \frac{a + b\lambda^i}{\delta}.$$

This concludes the proof. □

Proof of Proposition 3.5. We drop the exponent i in the proof for simplicity. According to Proposition 3.4, $c_t^* = \frac{1}{\kappa_c} \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda}$. As we have assumed that $\beta > 0$ in this subsection, we always have $c_t^* > 0$. Moreover, using the expressions of c_t^*, r_t^* given in Proposition 3.4, we have

$$c_t^* > r_t^* \iff \frac{r_t^*}{c_t^*} < 1 \iff \frac{\kappa_r^i}{\kappa_c^i} > \frac{a + b\lambda^i}{\delta}. \quad (\text{B.22})$$

(i) Let us assume that condition (10) is satisfied. Referring to Definition 3, it implies that the company greenwashes if, and only if, $E_t^* \geq V_t^*$. Now, if the company is overrated at time t , i.e. if $E_t^* \geq V_t^*$, as $0 \leq a, b \leq 1$ and $c_t^* > 0, c_t^* > r_t^*$, the only possibility to get $E_s^* < V_s^*$ is through the measurement noise $z dW_t$ in (2a). Indeed, referring to the explicit expression of $X_t^* = E_t^* - V_t^*$ in (B.20), all terms are positive except the Itô integral which can be negative, and which represents the measurement error.

Then, greenwashing effort can be computed as follows, using Proposition 3.4:

$$G^\beta := c_t^* - r_t^* = \frac{1}{\kappa_c} \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda} - \frac{1}{\kappa_r} \left(\frac{\beta}{\delta} - \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda} \right) = \frac{2}{\kappa} \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda} - \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r}.$$

Moreover, $G^\beta > 0$ as $c_t^* - r_t^* > 0$ under condition (10).

(ii) If condition (10) is not verified, we have $c_t^* \leq r_t^*$ for all t , and hence the company never greenwashes. \square

Proof of Proposition 3.6. We drop the exponent i for simplicity. Inserting optimal strategies of equation (9) into the dynamics of the environmental score (2a), one can deduce that $\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*]$ verifies the following ODE:

$$\begin{aligned} d\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*] &= \left(-(a + \lambda b)\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*] + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda} - \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right) dt, \\ \mathbb{E}[E_0^* - V_0^*] &= q - p. \end{aligned}$$

The solution to this ODE exists, is unique and given by

$$\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*] = e^{-(a+b\lambda)t} (q - p) + \left(\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda} - \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right) \frac{1}{a + b\lambda} \left(1 - e^{-(a+b\lambda)t} \right).$$

Therefore,

$$\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*] \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{a + b\lambda} \left(\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda} - \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} \right) =: L_\beta.$$

(Reminding that $a + b\lambda > 0$ as assumed after Definition 4.) Now,

$$L_\beta > 0 \iff \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} \frac{\beta}{\delta + a + b\lambda} - \frac{\beta}{\delta \kappa_r} > 0 \iff \frac{\kappa_r}{\kappa_c} > \frac{a + b\lambda}{\delta}.$$

This concludes the proof. \square

Proof of Proposition 3.7. Referring to Proposition 3.2, when $\beta = 0$, we have that $B^i = 0$, and A^i is unchanged. This gives optimal controls as in (11).

(i) and (ii) can be deduced from the shapes of the optimal controls in equation (11), using that $A^i > 0$ if $\alpha > 0$, as it can be seen in equation (7), and recording the definitions of the two types of environmental communication (Definitions 1 and 2). \square

Proof of Corollary 3.7.1. From (11), we get that

$$\kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*} = A^i (E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}), \quad \kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*} = -A^i (E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}).$$

Hence,

$$\frac{\kappa_r^i r_t^{i,*}}{\kappa_c^i c_t^{i,*}} = -1.$$

This concludes the proof. □

Proof of Proposition 3.8. According to equation (11), as $A^i \geq 0$ (refer to Proposition 3.2), when $E_t^{i,*} \geq V_t^{i,*}$, $c_t^* \leq 0$. And, when $E_t^{i,*} < V_t^{i,*}$, $c_t^{i,*} > 0$. Therefore, the cases $E_t^* \geq V_t^*$ and $c_t^* > 0$ never happen at the same instants. Referring to the definition of greenwashing (Definition 3), one can conclude that the company never practices greenwashing in this limiting case.

Now, let us show that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[E_t^{i,*} - V_t^{i,*}] = 0$. Inserting optimal strategies of equation (11) into the dynamics of the environmental score (2a), one can deduce that $\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*]$ verifies the following ODE:

$$\begin{aligned} d\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*] &= -(a + \lambda b + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A)\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*]dt, \\ \mathbb{E}[E_0^* - V_0^*] &= q - p. \end{aligned}$$

The solution to this ODE exists, is unique and given by

$$\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*] = e^{-(a+b\lambda+\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A)t} (q - p).$$

Therefore, $\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*] \xrightarrow{t \rightarrow \infty} 0$, where the convergence takes place with an exponential rate. □

Proof of Proposition 3.9. We drop the i indices in the proof for simplicity. We have

$$c_t^* - r_t^* = \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}(-A(E_t^* - V_t^*) + B) - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}. \quad (\text{B.23})$$

Hence, when $E_t^* \geq V_t^*$, the maximum value of $c_t^* - r_t^*$ is equal to $\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}$. Now,

$$\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} > 0 \iff \frac{\kappa_r}{\kappa_c} > \frac{a + b\lambda}{\delta}.$$

Therefore, referring to Definition 3, if $\frac{\kappa_r}{\kappa_c} \leq \frac{a+b\lambda}{\delta}$, the company never greenwashes.

Then, we have $c_t^* > 0 \iff E_t^* - V_t^* < \frac{B}{A}$ according to the optimal communication strategy given in Proposition 3.2. Moreover, one can deduce out of equation (B.23) that

$$c_t^* - r_t^* > 0 \iff E_t^* - V_t^* < \frac{1}{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A} \left(\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} \right) = \frac{B}{A} - \frac{1}{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}} \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} < \frac{B}{A}.$$

Combining the two conditions and referring to Definition 3, the company greenwashes if, and only if, $0 \leq E_t^* - V_t^* < \frac{1}{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A} \left(\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} \right)$, which is a non-empty event only under condition (10) which guarantees that $\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} > 0$, as stated above.

Moreover, as stated above, when $\frac{\kappa_r}{\kappa_c} > \frac{a+b\lambda}{\delta}$, $\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} > 0$ and it is the maximal value of $c_t^* - r_t^*$ when $E_t^* \geq V_t^*$, hence the maximal value of greenwashing effort. Moreover, greenwashing effort $c_t^* - r_t^*$ decreases linearly in $E_t^* - V_t^*$ according to equation (B.23). Finally, when $E_t^* - V_t^* = \frac{1}{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A} \left(\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} \right)$, greenwashing effort is null, as can be derived from the same equation. □

Proof of Proposition 3.10. Let us compute $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*]$. We have

$$c^* - r_t^* = \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} \left(-A(E_t^* - V_t^*) + B \right) - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}$$

and hence

$$d\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*] = \left(-(a + b\lambda + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A)\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*] + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} \right) dt.$$

This ODE has a unique solution which is

$$\mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*] = e^{-(a+b\lambda+\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A)t} \left(q - p - \frac{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}}{a + b\lambda + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A} \right) + \frac{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}}{a + b\lambda + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A}.$$

Therefore, we have

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[E_t^* - V_t^*] = \frac{\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r}}{a + b\lambda + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A} = \frac{1}{a + b\lambda + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A} G_{max},$$

where the convergence takes place with an exponential rate. □

Proof of Proposition 3.11. As usual, we drop the index i for the sake of simplicity.

(i) According to Propositions 3.9 and 3.2, we have

$$G_{max} = \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} = \beta \left(\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} \frac{1 + \frac{A}{\delta\kappa_r}}{\delta + a + \lambda b + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A} - \frac{1}{\delta\kappa_r} \right).$$

Noticing that $\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}B - \frac{\beta}{\delta\kappa_r} > 0$ when condition (10) is satisfied, as $\beta > 0$, we deduce that

$$\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} \frac{1 + \frac{A}{\delta\kappa_r}}{\delta + a + \lambda b + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}A} - \frac{1}{\delta\kappa_r} > 0$$

under this condition. It means that G_{max} increases linearly in β when condition (10) is satisfied.

(ii) Using the expression of A in Proposition 3.2, we get that

$$\frac{\partial G_{max}}{\partial \alpha} = \beta \frac{\frac{1}{\delta \kappa_r} (\delta + a + \lambda b) - \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}}{\left(\delta + a + \lambda b + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} A\right)^2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 + \frac{16}{\bar{\kappa}} \frac{T}{R^2}}} \frac{4}{\bar{\kappa}} \frac{1}{R} \frac{\lambda^i b^2}{\delta + \rho}.$$

Now,

$$\frac{1}{\delta \kappa_r} (\delta + a + \lambda b) - \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} < 0 \iff \frac{\kappa_r}{\kappa_c} > \frac{a + b\lambda}{\delta}.$$

Hence, as all the other terms are positive, G_{max} decreases with α when condition (10) is verified. Moreover, as T increases with α and A increases with α through T , we can see that $\frac{\partial G_{max}}{\partial \alpha}$ increases with α when condition (10) is verified, as it is negative under this condition. Hence, G_{max} is convex in α under condition (10). \square

Proof of Proposition 3.12. As usual, we drop the index i for the sake of simplicity.

(i) According to Proposition 3.2, the constant in the optimal abatement strategy is equal to

$$\frac{1}{\kappa_r} \left(\frac{\beta}{\delta} - B \right) = \beta \frac{1}{\kappa_r} \left(\frac{1}{\delta} - \frac{1 + \frac{A}{\delta \kappa_r}}{\delta + a + \lambda b + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} A} \right)$$

Now, using that $\frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} = \frac{1}{\kappa_r} + \frac{1}{\kappa_c}$, we have

$$\frac{1}{\delta} > \frac{1 + \frac{A}{\delta \kappa_r}}{\delta + a + \lambda b + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} A} \iff 1 > \frac{\delta + \frac{A}{\kappa_r}}{\delta + a + \lambda b + \left(\frac{1}{\kappa_r} + \frac{1}{\kappa_c}\right) A}$$

which is always true as all parameters are positive. Hence, $\frac{1}{\delta} - \frac{1 + \frac{A}{\delta \kappa_r}}{\delta + a + \lambda b + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} A} > 0$, which means that $\frac{1}{\kappa_r} \left(\frac{\beta}{\delta} - B \right)$ increases linearly in β .

(ii) Using the expression of A in Proposition 3.2, we get that

$$\frac{\partial \left(\frac{1}{\kappa_r} \left(\frac{\beta}{\delta} - B \right) \right)}{\partial \alpha} = - \frac{1}{\kappa_r} \beta \frac{\frac{1}{\delta \kappa_r} (\delta + a + \lambda b) - \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}}}{\left(\delta + a + \lambda b + \frac{2}{\bar{\kappa}} A\right)^2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 + \frac{16}{\bar{\kappa}} \frac{T}{R^2}}} \frac{8}{\bar{\kappa}^2} \frac{1}{R} \frac{\lambda^i b^2}{\delta + \rho}.$$

which is positive under condition (10), according to the proof of Proposition 3.11 (ii). Moreover, using similar arguments as in that proof, we get that, under condition (10), $\frac{1}{\kappa_r} \left(\frac{\beta}{\delta} - B \right)$ is concave in α . \square

B.4 Empirics

Proof of Lemma 5.1. Let us prove this lemma by considering the following generic specification, for all $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ and $t \in \{1, \dots, T\}$:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + X_{i,t}\beta + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$

where for each t , $(X_{i,t}, \varepsilon_{i,t})_i$ are integrable i.i.d. variables, for each i , $(X_{i,t}, \varepsilon_{i,t})$ is stationary, and $\forall t' \geq t$, $\mathbb{E}(X_{i,t}\varepsilon_{i,t'}) = 0$ (weak exogeneity assumption).

Let us set $\bar{X}_i = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T X_{i,t}$ and $\tilde{X}_{i,t} = X_{i,t} - \bar{X}_i$, and define $\bar{Y}_i, \tilde{Y}_{i,t}, \bar{\varepsilon}_i, \tilde{\varepsilon}_{i,t}$ similarly. The Within estimator, $\hat{\beta}$, verifies

$$\hat{\beta} = \left(\frac{1}{NT} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T (\tilde{X}_{i,t})^2 \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{NT} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T \tilde{X}_{i,t} \tilde{Y}_{i,t} \right),$$

that is,

$$\hat{\beta} = \beta + \left(\frac{1}{NT} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T (\tilde{X}_{i,t})^2 \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{NT} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T \tilde{X}_{i,t} \varepsilon_{i,t} \right),$$

where $\tilde{\varepsilon}_{i,t}$ is replaced by $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ because $\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \tilde{X}_{i,t} \bar{\varepsilon}_i = \bar{\varepsilon}_i \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \tilde{X}_{i,t} = 0$. Therefore, we can write the bias of the Within estimation as

$$\hat{\beta} - \beta = \left(\frac{1}{NT} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T (\tilde{X}_{i,t})^2 \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{NT} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T \tilde{X}_{i,t} \varepsilon_{i,t} \right).$$

By the law of large numbers, writing (X_t, ε_t) with the same distribution as $(X_{i,t}, \varepsilon_{i,t})$ for any i ,

$$\text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} (\hat{\beta} - \beta) = \left(\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E} [\tilde{X}_t^2] \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E} [\tilde{X}_t \varepsilon_t] \right),$$

writing plim for the convergence in probability.

Now, for each t , $\mathbb{E} (\tilde{X}_t \varepsilon_t) = \mathbb{E} ((X_t - \bar{X}) \varepsilon_t) = -\mathbb{E} (\bar{X} \varepsilon_t)$. Therefore, because $(X_t, \varepsilon_t)_t$ is stationary and $\mathbb{E}[X_t \varepsilon_t] = 0$ (from the weak exogeneity assumption), one can rewrite this bias as

$$\text{plim}_{N \rightarrow \infty} (\hat{\beta} - \beta) = \left(\mathbb{E} [\tilde{X}_t^2] \right)^{-1} (-\mathbb{E} (\bar{X} \varepsilon)), \quad t \in \{1, \dots, T\}.$$

However, from Cauchy-Schwartz,

$$|\mathbb{E} (\bar{X} \varepsilon)| \leq (\text{Var}(\bar{X}) \text{Var}(\varepsilon))^{1/2} = O(1/T)$$

if X_t and ε_t are weakly dependent.

Therefore, the bias tends to zero, and its limit in probability is upper-bounded by a variable that tends to zero at a rate $1/T$, which proves Lemma 5.1.

□

C Calibration

The reference calibration used in Section 3 is made to illustrate the properties of the model for a generic company.

We calibrate the frequency of controversies, λ , using the Environmental Controversy score provided by Covalence: λ is the average frequency for which this score is non-zero across the 13,298 companies in the whole Covalence database from January 2009 to December 2022. We assume that when a controversy occurs, the fundamental environmental value of the company is fully revealed ($b = 1$). We also assume that the rating agency progressively recovers the fundamental environmental value of the company over two years and a half on average ($a = 0.4$). We choose the marginal unit cost of environmental communication relative to the marginal unit cost of abatement ($\kappa_r/\kappa_c = 50$) in line with the ratio of a EUR 3,000,000 green bond emission to its certification costs (of the order of EUR 60,000).

We set the pro-environmental sensitivity of the investor, β , equal to the generic value of 1. Since the green premium and the misrating penalty premium are homogeneous metrics, we also assume that $\alpha = 1$. It is worth noting that α and β do not impact the “ON-OFF” greenwashing condition (equation (3.9)), but only contribute to scaling abatement, communication, and greenwashing efforts.

We consider a rate of time preference of 10% for both the company and the investor. Finally, we choose a noise factor, z , such that the error in measuring the environmental score remains negligible and does not make environmental communication deviate from its expected trend.

It is noteworthy that the calibration verifies the following two realistic conditions:

1. It is much more costly to abate than to do environmental communication ($\kappa_r \gg \kappa_c$).
2. The relative marginal unit costs κ_r/κ_c , asymmetry of information $a + b\lambda$, and rate of time preference δ , are so that condition (10) is satisfied.

In short, the calibration is as follows:

D Variables and Tables

Table C.1: Calibration.

Parameter	Value
a	0.4
b	1
λ	8.5%
κ_c	1
κ_r	50
β	1
α	1
ρ	0.1
δ	0.1
z	0.2

Table D.2: **First-step estimation.** This Table gives the results of the first-step estimation, which is a 2SLS Within panel regression with robust standard errors of the environmental reputation index at the end of the month t , Rep_t , on the environmental controversy index at the end of the month t that is instrumented by the environmental controversy index at the end of the month $t - 1$, Con_t^* . The standard deviation is shown in brackets below the estimate.

Dependent variable: Rep_t	
Con_t^*	0.040*** (0.013)
Firm FE	Yes
Observations	152,821
R ²	0.002
Adjusted R ²	-0.023
F Statistic	240.292***
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.3: **Relevance of the instrument used in the second-step estimation (top brownest companies and entire universe)**. This table shows the results of the Within regression with robust standard errors of the change in environmental score, ΔE_t^i , on the lagged environmental score, E_{t-1}^i . Both variables are used in the step-2 regression: the former is the independent variable and the latter is the instrument. The estimations are performed for different samples: the top 10%, 20%,..., 90% brownest companies, and the entire universe. The standard deviation is shown in brackets.

<i>Dependent variable: ΔE_t^i</i>					
Top brownest companies:					
	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%
E_{t-2}^i	-0.259*** (0.028)	-0.162*** (0.015)	-0.108*** (0.009)	-0.084*** (0.006)	-0.071*** (0.004)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	19,942	32,667	46,884	60,320	72,470
R ²	0.218	0.123	0.074	0.054	0.044
Adjusted R ²	0.167	0.074	0.028	0.012	0.004
F Statistic	5,224.462***	4,325.124***	3,572.930***	3,310.524***	3,215.831***

<i>Dependent variable: ΔE_t^i</i>					
Top brownest companies:					
	60%	70%	80%	90%	Whole sample
E_{t-2}^i	-0.059*** (0.003)	-0.048*** (0.002)	-0.039*** (0.002)	-0.030*** (0.001)	-0.023*** (0.001)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	88,223	102,884	116,290	130,457	152,821
R ²	0.034	0.026	0.021	0.015	0.011
Adjusted R ²	-0.002	-0.007	-0.010	-0.013	-0.014
F Statistic	2,981.010***	2,644.557***	2,366.927***	1,951.302***	1,673.251***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.4: **Relevance of the instrument used in the second-step estimation (top greenest companies and entire universe)**. This table shows the results of the Within regression with robust standard errors of the change in environmental score, ΔE_t^i , on the lagged environmental score, E_{t-1}^i . Both variables are used in the step-2 regression: the former is the independent variable and the latter is the instrument. The estimations are performed for different samples: the top 10%, 20%,..., 90% greenest companies, and the entire universe. The standard deviation is shown in brackets.

<i>Dependent variable: ΔE_t^i</i>					
Top greenest companies:					
	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%
E_{t-2}^i	-0.053*** (0.005)	-0.046*** (0.003)	-0.042*** (0.002)	-0.039*** (0.002)	-0.034*** (0.002)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	22,364	36,531	49,937	64,598	80,351
R ²	0.041	0.034	0.030	0.027	0.022
Adjusted R ²	0.006	0.002	-0.0001	-0.003	-0.006
F Statistic	917.932***	1,234.863***	1,507.587***	1,723.228***	1,764.086***
<i>Dependent variable: ΔE_t^i</i>					
Top greenest companies:					
	60%	70%	80%	90%	Whole sample
E_{t-2}^i	-0.031*** (0.002)	-0.027*** (0.001)	-0.025*** (0.001)	-0.023*** (0.001)	-0.023*** (0.001)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	92,501	105,937	120,154	132,879	152,821
R ²	0.019	0.016	0.013	0.012	0.011
Adjusted R ²	-0.010	-0.012	-0.014	-0.015	-0.014
F Statistic	1,708.114***	1,643.758***	1,541.759***	1,551.436***	1,673.251***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.5: **Main estimation with time fixed effects and controls (top brownest companies and entire universe)**. This Table gives the results of the step-2 estimation, which is a Within panel regression with robust standard errors of the change in the proxy for the environmental communication flow, $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$, on the change in environmental score instrumented by the lagged environmental score, $\Delta E_t^{i,*}$, including time fixed effects as well as controls for systematic risk and return. The estimations are performed for different samples: the top 10%, 20%,..., 90% brownest companies, and the entire universe. The standard deviations are shown in brackets below the estimates.

Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$					
Top brownest companies:					
	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%
$\Delta E_t^{i,*}$	0.168 (0.161)	-0.150 (0.136)	-0.253** (0.128)	-0.241*** (0.087)	-0.459*** (0.159)
R_{t-1}^i	0.216 (0.260)	0.135 (0.182)	0.324* (0.197)	0.180 (0.140)	0.139 (0.145)
$\beta_{t-1}^{CAPM,i}$	0.012 (0.023)	0.038** (0.016)	-0.010 (0.021)	0.009 (0.012)	0.021* (0.013)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,044	9,190	12,473	15,507	18,033
R ²	0.006	0.008	0.013	0.014	0.019
Adjusted R ²	-0.073	-0.056	-0.044	-0.037	-0.028
F Statistic	1.020	1.575	2.704	1.828	4.724
Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$					
Top brownest companies:					
	60%	70%	80%	90%	Whole sample
$\Delta E_t^{i,*}$	-0.281** (0.130)	-0.195* (0.105)	-0.164* (0.091)	-0.166** (0.072)	-0.083* (0.050)
R_{t-1}^i	0.188 (0.147)	0.366** (0.163)	0.374** (0.154)	0.322** (0.137)	0.252** (0.124)
$\beta_{t-1}^{CAPM,i}$	0.012 (0.011)	0.021 (0.014)	0.009 (0.010)	0.012 (0.008)	0.010 (0.007)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21,749	25,249	28,980	33,168	41,252
R ²	0.018	0.017	0.017	0.019	0.016
Adjusted R ²	-0.025	-0.023	-0.019	-0.013	-0.012
F Statistic	2.420	4.896	4.795	4.225	3.014

Note:

Table D.6: **Main estimation with time fixed effects and controls (top greenest companies and entire universe)**. This Table gives the results of the step-2 estimation, which is a Within panel regression with robust standard errors of the change in the proxy for the environmental communication flow, $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$, on the change in environmental score instrumented by the lagged environmental score, $\Delta E_t^{i,*}$, including time fixed effects as well as controls for systematic risk and return. The estimations are performed for different samples: the top 10%, 20%,..., 90% greenest companies, and the entire universe. The standard deviations are shown in brackets below the estimates.

Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$					
Top greenest companies:					
	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%
$\Delta E_t^{i,*}$	-0.205 (0.182)	-0.380** (0.178)	-0.261* (0.142)	-0.243** (0.096)	-0.280*** (0.093)
R_{t-1}^i	-0.335 (0.287)	-0.222 (0.245)	-0.002 (0.217)	0.348 (0.241)	0.480** (0.232)
$\beta_{t-1}^{CAPM,i}$	0.005 (0.015)	0.008 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.027)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.014)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,084	12,272	16,003	19,503	23,219
R ²	0.016	0.021	0.023	0.022	0.020
Adjusted R ²	-0.023	-0.012	-0.008	-0.009	-0.009
F Statistic	1.504	3.582	1.748	3.120	5.449
Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$					
Top greenest companies:					
	60%	70%	80%	90%	Whole sample
$\Delta E_t^{i,*}$	-0.385*** (0.093)	-0.284*** (0.086)	-0.251*** (0.093)	-0.193*** (0.067)	-0.083* (0.050)
R_{t-1}^i	0.375* (0.220)	0.185 (0.170)	0.316* (0.171)	0.255* (0.153)	0.252** (0.124)
$\beta_{t-1}^{CAPM,i}$	0.005 (0.011)	0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.012)	-0.0002 (0.010)	0.010 (0.007)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	25,745	28,779	32,062	35,208	41,252
R ²	0.023	0.022	0.023	0.022	0.016
Adjusted R ²	-0.007	-0.007	-0.006	-0.006	-0.012
F Statistic	5.711	2.722	4.029	2.754	3.014

Note:

Table D.7: **Main estimation with different starting dates (focus on the 50% brownest and 50% greenest companies)**. This Table gives the results of the step-2 estimation, which is a Within panel regression with robust standard errors of the change in the proxy for the environmental communication flow, $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$, on the change in environmental score instrumented by the lagged environmental score, $\Delta E_t^{i,*}$, from different starting dates. This table focuses on the sample of the 50% brownest companies (upper panel) and 50% greenest companies (lower panel) in each sector on each date. The standard deviations are shown in brackets below the estimates.

Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$				
50% brownest companies				
	Since 2012	Since 2017	Since 2019	Since 2021
$\Delta E_t^{i,*}$	-0.271*** (0.060)	-0.226*** (0.057)	-0.220*** (0.072)	-0.237*** (0.087)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	68,276	57,626	43,107	19,098
R ²	0.013	0.014	0.019	0.022
Adjusted R ²	-0.029	-0.034	-0.042	-0.093
F Statistic	4.949**	3.497*	3.420*	4.817**
Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$				
50% greenest companies				
	Since 2012	Since 2017	Since 2019	Since 2021
$\Delta E_t^{i,*}$	-0.415*** (0.057)	-0.457*** (0.061)	-0.449*** (0.065)	-0.353*** (0.069)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	77,232	64,719	48,000	20,768
R ²	0.020	0.022	0.026	0.029
Adjusted R ²	-0.009	-0.012	-0.020	-0.075
F Statistic	10.606***	13.629***	18.549***	9.557***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.8: **Main estimation applied to different environmental subscores (focus on the 50% brownest and 50% greenest companies)**. This Table gives the results of the step-2 estimation, which is a Within panel regression with robust standard errors of the change in the proxy for the environmental communication flow, $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$, on the change in environmental score instrumented by the lagged environmental score, $\Delta E_t^{i,*}$, applied to different environmental subscores, which are related to (i) the environmental impacts of the products sold ($E_t^{Imp,i,*}$), (ii) the resources used ($E_t^{Res,i,*}$), and (iii) the emissions, effluents, and waste ($E_t^{Emi,i,*}$). This table focuses on the sample of the 50% brownest companies in each sector on each date. The standard deviations are shown in brackets below the estimates.

Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$			
50% brownest companies			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta E_t^{Imp,i,*}$	-0.142*** (0.046)		
$\Delta E_t^{Res,i,*}$		-0.180*** (0.047)	
$\Delta E_t^{Emi,i,*}$			-0.204*** (0.051)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	68,276	68,276	68,276
R ²	0.006	0.005	0.015
Adjusted R ²	-0.036	-0.037	-0.027
F Statistic	2.087	3.580*	3.978**
Dependent variable: $\Delta\hat{c}_t^i$			
50% greenest companies			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta E_t^{Imp,i,*}$	-0.269*** (0.042)		
$\Delta E_t^{Res,i,*}$		-0.252*** (0.038)	
$\Delta E_t^{Emi,i,*}$			-0.225*** (0.036)
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	77,232	77,232	77,232
R ²	0.013	0.009	0.014
Adjusted R ²	-0.016	-0.020	-0.016
F Statistic	5.953**	8.354***	8.135***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.9: **Variables.** Description of and statistics on the variables used in the empirical analysis.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	# values	Description
Rep	83.0	18.7	0	100	155,852	Rep is the monthly environmental reputation score based on forward-looking news data, provided by Covalence, “reflecting companies’ sustainability commitments, targets, and ambitions” regarding the environment. “The basic metrics used are quantities of news items gathered on the web that can be coded as having a positive or negative polarity towards named companies. Positive news articles are called “endorsements,” while articles with negative polarity are “controversies.” A historical erosion factor is applied to the quantities of positive and negative news with recent articles weighting more than older ones. The sentiment, or reputation score, is given by the share of positive news over the total of positive and negative news.”
Con	8.7	19.6	0	100	155,707	Con is the monthly environmental controversy score provided by Covalence. It is constructed in a similar way to the environmental reputation score using news-based data focused on environmental controversies.
E	54.9	10.3	17.9	94.0	155,707	E is the monthly environmental score provided by Covalence. It is constructed based on two types of data: quantitative indicators (data disclosed annually by companies) and news-based data (published by the media and other stakeholders).
ΔE	0.10	0.7	-22.0	21.0	152,821	ΔE is the change in environmental score over two consecutive months.
c	0.2	2.9	-67.9	73.0	149,136	c is the monthly environmental communication variable, which is constructed through the first step of the empirical analysis in Section 4.1.
Δc	-0.004	4.0	-79.0	101.3	145,508	Δc is the change in environmental communication over two consecutive months.
R	0.01	0.1	-0.9	8.8	44,825	R is the monthly realized return on the stocks issued by the companies.
β^{CAPM}	1.1	1.1	-16.7	26.1	44,067	β^{CAPM} is the CAPM beta of each stock defined as $\beta_t^{CAPM,i} = Var^{-1}(r_t^m)Cov(r_t^i, r_t^m)$, where r^i and r^m denote firm i 's return and the market return, respectively.

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