Authors: Markus Leippold (University of Zurich and Swiss Finance Institute), Zacharias Sautner (University of Zurich and Swiss Finance Institute) and Tingyu Yu (University of Zurich)
Presenter: Tingyu Yu (University of Zurich and Swiss Finance Institute)
A common concern is that ambitious climate policy is—at least in parts—obstructed by corporate lobbying activities. We quantify corporate anti- and pro-climate lobbying expenses, identify the largest corporate lobbyists and their motives, establish how climate lobbying relates to corporate business models, and document whether and how climate lobbying is priced in financial markets. Firms spend on average $277k per year on anti-climate lobbying ($185k on pro-climate lobbying). Recently, firms have tried to camouflage their climate lobbying activities. Large anti-climate lobbyists have more carbon-intensive business models and face more climate-related incidents in the future. Firms that spend more on anti-climate lobbying earn higher returns, probably because of a risk premium. Their stock prices went up when the Waxman-Markey Cap-and-Trade Bill failed, and down when the Inflation Reduction Act was announced.
Authors: Quyen Nguyen (University of Otago), Ivan Diaz-Rainey (Griffith University), Adam Kitto (University of New South Wales), Nicholas Pittman (EMMI), Renzhu Zhang (University of Otago)