We show that the accumulation of past experiences can shape prosocial preferences of corporate directors, who in turn influence corporate climate policies. Firms significantly reduce their scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emission intensities when they have more Directors with Abnormal Disaster Experience (DADEs) on their boards. Firms are also significantly more likely to assign climate policy responsibilities to the board, set explicit emission targets or reduction initiatives, or provide climate-related incentives to management when they have more DADEs on their boards. These results are driven by DADEs who wield influence on firm policy: e.g., directors on governance, audit, or ESG committees, or male directors. However, DADEs on compensation, finance, or risk committees do not have such effects on firm emissions. Importantly, accumulated disaster experiences over directors’ careers are far more important than more recent experiences. Director experiences are meaningful primarily for abnormally devastating natural disasters, and among emission-intensive firms or larger firms. Finally, the results are not driven by recent trends in attention to climate change. Overall, the results are more consistent with past accumulated experiences affecting prosocial preferences of directors rather than informing their beliefs about climate risks, and these preferences entering the corporate boardroom.
