Authors: Peter Tankov (ENSAE, Institut Polytechnique de Paris), Olivier David Zerbib (ENSAE, Institut Polytechnique de Paris) and Fanny Cartellier (ENSAE, Institut Polytechnique de Paris)
Presenter: Peter Tankov (ENSAE, Institut Polytechnique de Paris)
We show how investors with pro-environmental preferences and who penalize revelations of past environmental controversies impact corporate greenwashing practices. Through a dynamic equilibrium model with information asymmetry, we characterize firms’ optimal environmental communication, emissions reduction, and greenwashing policies, and we explain the forces driving them. Notably, under a condition that we explicitly characterize, companies greenwash to inflate their environmental score above their fundamental environmental value, with an effort and impact increasing with investors’ pro-environmental preferences. However, investment decisions that penalize greenwashing, policies increasing transparency, and environment-related technological innovation contribute to mitigating corporate greenwashing. We provide empirical support for our results.
Authors: Quyen Nguyen (University of Otago), Ivan Diaz-Rainey (Griffith University), Adam Kitto (University of New South Wales), Nicholas Pittman (EMMI), Renzhu Zhang (University of Otago)
